CAJ | 학술논문

在现实经济活动中，地方政府与中央政府的利益诉求是不一致的，甚至是相互冲突的。当中央政府与地方政府双方都力图实现自身利益最大化的诉求时，双方无疑会产生利益博弈。从交易费用理论视角来看，我国现行基本养老保险制度存在的依人群设计和地区分割、画地为牢问题之所以会存在，其根源在于中央政府与地方政府间存在非均衡博弈，由此导致交易中处于最弱势地位的劳动者养老保险权益受损。
재현실경제활동중，지방정부여중앙정부적이익소구시불일치적，심지시상호충돌적。당중앙정부여지방정부쌍방도력도실현자신이익최대화적소구시，쌍방무의회산생이익박혁。종교역비용이론시각래간，아국현행기본양로보험제도존재적의인군설계화지구분할、화지위뢰문제지소이회존재，기근원재우중앙정부여지방정부간존재비균형박혁，유차도치교역중처우최약세지위적노동자양로보험권익수손。
In real economic activity, interest demands of local governments and the central government are inconsistent, even conflicting, when both the central government and local governments are trying to maximize their own interests demands, the two sides will undoubtedly generate interests of the game. From the perspective of transaction cost theory, China’s current basic old-age insurance system exist design and region according to the crowd, the reason restricting problems exists, and its roots are in the presence of non-balanced game between the central government and local governments, resulting in workers pension rights damaged and most disadvantaged by transferring.