CAJ | 학술논문

土地财政的形成既与我国的财政体制和税收结构有关，也与中央政府的目标变化以及地方政府的目标构成密切相关。本文使用博弈论方法分析各个利益主体的收益函数与战略选择，揭示地方政府土地财政形成的内在机理与演化过程。研究表明：当中央政府倾向于社会公平而选择集权时容易形成土地财政；当中央政府选择分权时使得地方政府获得较强的激励去推动地方经济发展，则不会形成土地财政；同时，地方政府与开发商之间的博弈取决于地方政府官员的选择。本文的建议是：（1）改善分税制的制度设计；（2）加大地方政府违规征地处罚力度；（3）改革传统干部GDP考核制度。
토지재정적형성기여아국적재정체제화세수결구유관，야여중앙정부적목표변화이급지방정부적목표구성밀절상관。본문사용박혁론방법분석각개이익주체적수익함수여전략선택，게시지방정부토지재정형성적내재궤리여연화과정。연구표명：당중앙정부경향우사회공평이선택집권시용역형성토지재정；당중앙정부선택분권시사득지방정부획득교강적격려거추동지방경제발전，칙불회형성토지재정；동시，지방정부여개발상지간적박혁취결우지방정부관원적선택。본문적건의시：（1）개선분세제적제도설계；（2）가대지방정부위규정지처벌력도；（3）개혁전통간부GDP고핵제도。
The formation of land finance is both related to the financial system and tax structure of China and is closely related to both the objective change of central government and the goal composition of local governments. This paper uses Game Theory Methodology to analyze the earnings function of each main body of the interests and its strategic choice and reveals the intrinsic mechanism and evolution progress of the finance formation of local governments. Research results show that the land finance is easily formed when central government prefers social fairness to choose centralized power, that land finance can not be formed when central government chooses decentralized power to make local governments get stronger incentive to promote local economic development, and meanwhile, the game between local governments and developing merchants depends on the choice of the offi?cials of the local governments. This paper suggests ( 1) improve the institutional design of tax distribution system, ( 2) enlarge the penalty on the local governments for illegal expropriation of land, (3)reform the traditional cadre evaluation by GDP.