科技管理研究
科技管理研究
과기관리연구
SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY MANAGEMENT RESEARCH
2014年
21期
11-16
,共6页
薛克雷%潘郁%叶斌%姜亚梅
薛剋雷%潘鬱%葉斌%薑亞梅
설극뢰%반욱%협빈%강아매
产学研%协同创新%信任关系%演化博弈%激励
產學研%協同創新%信任關繫%縯化博弈%激勵
산학연%협동창신%신임관계%연화박혁%격려
industry -university -research%collaborative innovation%trust%evolutionary game%motivation
针对产学研协同创新中信任行为的动态演变性,应用演化博弈理论构建基于有限理性的产学研协同创新信任关系演化博弈模型,深入研究产学研协同创新信任关系。研究表明,产学研协同创新信任关系包含多重均衡结果;博弈双方相互信任的概率与协同收益正相关,与创新资源投入、投机收益负相关,与吸收因子无关;存在着最佳的协同收益分配比例,使博弈双方相互信任的可能性最大化;政府加强对创新资源的激励机制可以有效提高产学研协同创新的信任水平。
針對產學研協同創新中信任行為的動態縯變性,應用縯化博弈理論構建基于有限理性的產學研協同創新信任關繫縯化博弈模型,深入研究產學研協同創新信任關繫。研究錶明,產學研協同創新信任關繫包含多重均衡結果;博弈雙方相互信任的概率與協同收益正相關,與創新資源投入、投機收益負相關,與吸收因子無關;存在著最佳的協同收益分配比例,使博弈雙方相互信任的可能性最大化;政府加彊對創新資源的激勵機製可以有效提高產學研協同創新的信任水平。
침대산학연협동창신중신임행위적동태연변성,응용연화박혁이론구건기우유한이성적산학연협동창신신임관계연화박혁모형,심입연구산학연협동창신신임관계。연구표명,산학연협동창신신임관계포함다중균형결과;박혁쌍방상호신임적개솔여협동수익정상관,여창신자원투입、투궤수익부상관,여흡수인자무관;존재착최가적협동수익분배비례,사박혁쌍방상호신임적가능성최대화;정부가강대창신자원적격려궤제가이유효제고산학연협동창신적신임수평。
The trust behavior in Industry -University -Research collaborative innovation has properties of dynamic evolu-tion.This paper applies the theory of evolutionary game to the study of trust relationship in IUR collaborative innovation and establishes the evolutionary game model for trust relationship based on the limited rationality of game participants.The re-search shows that the trust relationship in IUR collaborative innovation contains multiple equilibrium results.The probability of mutual trust between game participants is correlated positively with the synergistic benefits,and is correlated negatively with the innovation resource inputs and opportunity incomes.However,it has no relation with absorption factor.There is an optimal distribution ratio of synergistic benefits allocation to maximize the probability of each other trust of game partici-pants.Furthermore,the motivation mechanism to innovation resource inputs can promote trust level in IUR collaborative in-novation effectively.