CAJ | 학술논문

本文基于股东间代理问题视角，利用2007~2011年我国A股上市公司数据，实证考察了高管薪酬的过度支付是否会成为控股股东实现控制权私利的一种路径。研究发现：在地方国企中，高管薪酬水平与控股股东的现金流权显著负相关，与控股股东控制权与现金流权的两权分离度显著正相关，但这一结论在央企和民营企业中均不成立。这表明地方国企高管薪酬决定存在明显的掏空效应。本文的研究结论对于深化国企高管薪酬管理制度改革具有政策启示涵义。
본문기우고동간대리문제시각，이용2007~2011년아국A고상시공사수거，실증고찰료고관신수적과도지부시부회성위공고고동실현공제권사리적일충로경。연구발현：재지방국기중，고관신수수평여공고고동적현금류권현저부상관，여공고고동공제권여현금류권적량권분리도현저정상관，단저일결론재앙기화민영기업중균불성립。저표명지방국기고관신수결정존재명현적도공효응。본문적연구결론대우심화국기고관신수관리제도개혁구유정책계시함의。
From the Perspective of principal-principal agency problem, this paper empirically analyses whether there exist the tunneling effect in the determination of CEO compensation of Chinese Listed Companies. We find that there is a signifi-cant negative relationship between controlling shareholder's cash flow right and the level of CEO compensation, while the wedge between control right and cash flow right of controlling shareholder has a significant positive effect on the level of CEO compensation in local government controlled firms. But such relationships do not exit in both central government controlled firms and privately owned firms. These findings have policy implications for the reform of SOEs' executive compensation system.