华东经济管理
華東經濟管理
화동경제관리
EAST CHINA ECONOMIC MANAGEMENT
2014年
12期
84-90
,共7页
并购频率%过度自信%管理层私利%货币薪酬%在职消费
併購頻率%過度自信%管理層私利%貨幣薪酬%在職消費
병구빈솔%과도자신%관리층사리%화폐신수%재직소비
M&A frequency%overconfidence%executive personal benefits%monetary compensation%non-pecuniary com-pensation
上市公司管理层频繁发起的并购是出于其过度自信还是私利驱动?依据行为经济学和委托代理等基本理论,文章选取2008-2011年发生并购事件的上市公司为研究样本,利用Logit回归模型和负二项回归模型,将管理层过度自信的心理偏差和追求个人收益的自利动机纳入同一框架进行研究。研究结果表明,尽管发生并购事件的上市公司中管理层过度自信的心理状态普遍存在,但管理层发起频繁并购的动机更多的是出于其对个人私利的追求;而在上市公司频繁并购的诱因中,管理层的过度自信具有“杠杆效应”,即:管理层过度自信的心理状态会增强其为了谋取货币薪酬和在职消费等个人私利最大化而实施高频率并购活动的意愿。研究发现为公司连续并购的动因理论做出了增量贡献,也利于丰富基于中国制度背景的并购相关研究议题的经验证据。
上市公司管理層頻繁髮起的併購是齣于其過度自信還是私利驅動?依據行為經濟學和委託代理等基本理論,文章選取2008-2011年髮生併購事件的上市公司為研究樣本,利用Logit迴歸模型和負二項迴歸模型,將管理層過度自信的心理偏差和追求箇人收益的自利動機納入同一框架進行研究。研究結果錶明,儘管髮生併購事件的上市公司中管理層過度自信的心理狀態普遍存在,但管理層髮起頻繁併購的動機更多的是齣于其對箇人私利的追求;而在上市公司頻繁併購的誘因中,管理層的過度自信具有“槓桿效應”,即:管理層過度自信的心理狀態會增彊其為瞭謀取貨幣薪酬和在職消費等箇人私利最大化而實施高頻率併購活動的意願。研究髮現為公司連續併購的動因理論做齣瞭增量貢獻,也利于豐富基于中國製度揹景的併購相關研究議題的經驗證據。
상시공사관리층빈번발기적병구시출우기과도자신환시사리구동?의거행위경제학화위탁대리등기본이론,문장선취2008-2011년발생병구사건적상시공사위연구양본,이용Logit회귀모형화부이항회귀모형,장관리층과도자신적심리편차화추구개인수익적자리동궤납입동일광가진행연구。연구결과표명,진관발생병구사건적상시공사중관리층과도자신적심리상태보편존재,단관리층발기빈번병구적동궤경다적시출우기대개인사리적추구;이재상시공사빈번병구적유인중,관리층적과도자신구유“강간효응”,즉:관리층과도자신적심리상태회증강기위료모취화폐신수화재직소비등개인사리최대화이실시고빈솔병구활동적의원。연구발현위공사련속병구적동인이론주출료증량공헌,야리우봉부기우중국제도배경적병구상관연구의제적경험증거。
Are the frequent M&As driven by the management of the listed companies out of their overconfidence or personal benefits? According to the basic theories of behavioral economics and principal-agent, the paper selects the listed compa?nies with M&A events during the year of 2008 to 2011 as the research samples, and employs Logit regression model and negative binomial regression model,and makes a study by incorporating the psychological deviation of the management over?confidence and the self-serving motive for pursuit of personal benefits into the same framework. The results show that: Al?though the management of the listed companies which initiates M&As is common with overconfidence,more M&As are mo?tivated by the management’s pursuit of personal benefits; The management overconfidence plays a role of “leverage ef?fect” in the incentives of frequent M&As of the listed companies, that is, the management with overconfidence is more willing to initiate high-frequency M&A activities,which are motivated by the pursuit of the maximization of personal bene?fits of monetary compensation and non-pecuniary compensation. The study makes contributions to extending the motive theo?ry of continuous M&As,and enriches the empirical evidence of M&As in the context of the Chinese regime.