CAJ | 학술논문

目的了解企业工人对理论工伤保险的意愿参与和支付情况及影响因素,为各级政府和相关部门制定相关政策提供信息.方法采用多阶段整群抽样的方法,首先根据经济发展水平、交通便利及相关部门配合情况选取浙江省3市(县)9家大中小型企业,随机抽取若干个车间,对整个车间的工人进行调查.采用面对面问卷调查方式,由事先经过培训的调查员进入车间询问,并填写问卷相关内容.结果 73.87％(2 095名)的工人愿意参加理论工伤保险,平均愿意支付工人每月工资的2.21％(51.77元),超过半数的工人愿意支付比例不超过每月工资的1％(35元).在不愿意参加保险的741名工人中,有327人认为“不应由个人承担保费,应该由国家或企业承担”,其他工人因为经济水平或因为工作不稳定或自身对理论工伤保险未了解透彻造成不愿意参加.Logistic回归结果发现,教育程度越高、工龄和每周工作时间越长、职业病知晓情况越好,愿意参加保险的概率也越高;从事物理性有害因素的岗位、已经建立健康档案、已经参加一般医保/工伤保险的工人更愿意参加保险.多元线性回归结果分析,随着月平均收入、每周工作时间、自我健康评分的增加,企业工人的意愿支付比例也增加;而工作强度越大、对职业病知晓情况越好的工人意愿支付比例反而降低.未参加工伤保险的工人支付程度高于已经参加工伤保险的工人.结论理论工伤保险扩大了统筹层次,突显第三方独立运行、终身制等的优势,从而显著提高了作业工人的意愿参与和意愿支付比例.因此,工伤保险可以从这些方面进行改进,以便提高企业工人参与及支付积极性.这也能为当前解决企业保费支付拖延、抵触等问题提供了参考.
목적 료해기업공인대이론공상보험적의원삼여화지부정황급영향인소,위각급정부화상관부문제정상관정책제공신식.방법 채용다계단정군추양적방법,수선근거경제발전수평、교통편리급상관부문배합정황선취절강성3시(현)9가대중소형기업,수궤추취약간개차간,대정개차간적공인진행조사.채용면대면문권조사방식,유사선경과배훈적조사원진입차간순문,병전사문권상관내용.결과 73.87％(2 095명)적공인원의삼가이론공상보험,평균원의지부공인매월공자적2.21％(51.77원),초과반수적공인원의지부비례불초과매월공자적1％(35원).재불원의삼가보험적741명공인중,유327인인위“불응유개인승담보비,응해유국가혹기업승담”,기타공인인위경제수평혹인위공작불은정혹자신대이론공상보험미료해투철조성불원의삼가.Logistic회귀결과발현,교육정도월고、공령화매주공작시간월장、직업병지효정황월호,원의삼가보험적개솔야월고;종사물이성유해인소적강위、이경건립건강당안、이경삼가일반의보/공상보험적공인경원의삼가보험.다원선성회귀결과분석,수착월평균수입、매주공작시간、자아건강평분적증가,기업공인적의원지부비례야증가;이공작강도월대、대직업병지효정황월호적공인의원지부비례반이강저.미삼가공상보험적공인지부정도고우이경삼가공상보험적공인.결론 이론공상보험확대료통주층차,돌현제삼방독립운행、종신제등적우세,종이현저제고료작업공인적의원삼여화의원지부비례.인차,공상보험가이종저사방면진행개진,이편제고기업공인삼여급지부적겁성.저야능위당전해결기업보비지부타연、저촉등문제제공료삼고.
Objective To investigate workers' willingness to participate and wiliness to pay for a hypothetical industrial injury insurance scheme,to analyze the influential factors,and to provide information for policy making of the government.Methods Multistage cluster sampling was used to select subjects:In the first stage,9 small,medium,or large enterprises were selected from three cities (counties) in Zhejiang province,China,according to the level of economic development,transportation convenience,and cooperation of government agencies; in the second stage,several workshops were randomly selected from each of the 9 enterprises.Face-to-face interviews among all workers in the workshops were conducted by trained interviewers using a pre-designed questionnaire.Results It was found that 73.87 ％ (2095) of all workers were willing to participate in the hypothetical work injury insurance scheme and to pay 2.21％ of monthly wage (51.77 yuan) on average,and more than half of the workers were willing to pay less than 1％ of monthly wage (35 yuan).Of the 741 workers who were not willing to participate,327 thought that the premium should be borne by the state or enterprises,instead of individuals,and others were not willing to participate because of low income,unstable job,or poor understanding of the hypothetical industrial injury insurance scheme.Logistic regression analysis showed that workers with higher education levels,longer length of services,longer weekly working time,or more knowledge of occupational diseases showed higher willingness to participate in the scheme; workers who were exposed to physical hazards,had health records,or had participated in the existing medical insurance or industrial injury insurance were more willing to participate.Multiple linear regression analysis showed that with increasing average monthly wage,weekly working time,and self-health evaluation,the proportion of workers with willingness to pay increased; however,with increasing work intensity and awareness of occupational disease,the proportion of workers with willingness to pay decreased.The workers who were not covered by the industrial injury insurance paid more than those covered by the industrial injury insurance.Conclusion The hypothetical industrial injury insurance scheme increased the applicability and advantage of independent third-party running and lifetime insurance,which significantly increased the workers' willingness to participate in or to pay for the insurance scheme.Therefore,the industrial injury insurance can be improved in these aspects to promote workers' willingness to participate in and to pay for the insurance scheme.This conclusion provided a reference for the solution of delayed or shirking corporate responsibility for paying the premium.