CAJ | 학술논문

当前我国城市廉租住房市场中,普遍存在承租户隐瞒家庭收入、不主动腾退住房现象,这与廉租住房退出机制的不完善密切相关.针对此问题,在理性经济人假设下,构建了政府与承租户之间的完全信息静态博弈模型.通过纳什均衡解分析,揭示了政府和承租户的行为选择规律,即影响二者行为选择的关键因素在于参与人选择不同策略时的收益,得出引入奖励机制能有效规避承租户不良行为,降低政府监管成本的结论.为提高退出机制实施效力,有效实现公平分配,提出了政府解决相关现实问题的政策路径.
당전아국성시렴조주방시장중,보편존재승조호은만가정수입、불주동등퇴주방현상,저여렴조주방퇴출궤제적불완선밀절상관.침대차문제,재이성경제인가설하,구건료정부여승조호지간적완전신식정태박혁모형.통과납십균형해분석,게시료정부화승조호적행위선택규률,즉영향이자행위선택적관건인소재우삼여인선택불동책략시적수익,득출인입장려궤제능유효규피승조호불량행위,강저정부감관성본적결론.위제고퇴출궤제실시효력,유효실현공평분배,제출료정부해결상관현실문제적정책로경.
For low-rent housing in China, tenants always like to conceal their family income and rarely voluntarily empty the houses since the exit mechanism is not perfect. Aiming to perfect the exit mechanism, based on the assumption of economic man,a complete information static game models between the government and the tenants is built. By analyzing the game Nash equilibrium, the behavior patterns of the government and the tenants were revealed and benefit is a key factor that has a significant impact on their behaviors. The incentive mechanism can effectively avoid illegal activities and reduce the cost of supervision. Some suggestions on policy making were given to improve the mechanism.