CAJ | 학술논문

针对局中人在不确定支付条件下如何分配联盟赢得的问题.运用凸随机特征函数将凸随机对策的核心和稳定集加以推广,在分配弱优超基础上建立凸随机合作对策的弱核心与弱稳定集的概念,进一步研究它们之间的性质及关系.提出一种联盟收益分配即弱核心,采用偏好关系具体化的方法证明了弱核心的存在性及唯一性,从而扩展了凸随机合作对策解的研究.
침대국중인재불학정지부조건하여하분배련맹영득적문제.운용철수궤특정함수장철수궤대책적핵심화은정집가이추엄,재분배약우초기출상건립철수궤합작대책적약핵심여약은정집적개념,진일보연구타문지간적성질급관계.제출일충련맹수익분배즉약핵심,채용편호관계구체화적방법증명료약핵심적존재성급유일성,종이확전료철수궤합작대책해적연구.
@@@@To overcome the problem for agents allocating the payoff with uncertainty, a new imputation for convex stochastic cooperative games with convex stochastic characteristic function is defined in this study. The core and the stable set on the basis of weak optimal distribution are established. This study presents the core of allocation of coalition, e.g., weak core. The existence and uniqueness of the weak core are proved using preference relation specific methods, which extends the theory of convex stochastic cooperative games solutions.