CAJ | 학술논문

发电厂商为获取更多收益,在市场竞争中有时会采取类似“串谋”的结盟报价行为抬高市场报价.以我国实际运营的华东电网跨省集中交易的实际数据为例研究了发电厂商结盟报价行为.首先对部分月份发电厂商的报价数据进行概率分析,确认其为结盟报价.在此基础上,基于合作博弈的基本原理分析了发电厂商结盟报价的内在机理,给出了市场规则与结盟报价之间的关系,进而提出了抑制发电厂商结盟报价的建议措施.理论分析以及市场实践均验证了所提措施的有效性.
발전엄상위획취경다수익,재시장경쟁중유시회채취유사“천모”적결맹보개행위태고시장보개.이아국실제운영적화동전망과성집중교역적실제수거위례연구료발전엄상결맹보개행위.수선대부분월빈발전엄상적보개수거진행개솔분석,학인기위결맹보개.재차기출상,기우합작박혁적기본원리분석료발전엄상결맹보개적내재궤리,급출료시장규칙여결맹보개지간적관계,진이제출료억제발전엄상결맹보개적건의조시.이론분석이급시장실천균험증료소제조시적유효성.
@@@@To accrue more profits in market competitions, the power producers sometimes would adopt the collusion bidding strategy to force up prices. The paper discusses the collusion bidding behavior of the power producers, which is based on the actual running data of trans-provincial electric power market of the East China Power Grid. Firstly, the probability analysis based on the bidding data of the monthly producers is used to confirm whether it is a collusion one. On this foundation, based on the basic principles of the cooperative game, we analyze the internal mechanisms of the collusion bidding, and show the relationship between market rules and this behavior. Furthermore, several possible strategies are proposed to inhibit it. Both the theoretical analysis and the market practice show the effectiveness of the proposed strategies.