CAJ | 학술논문

通过建立数学模型,在传统委托代理理论基础上,将组织承诺纳入企业员工激励机制研究.首先,在员工的组织承诺类型可被观测的信息对称情形下,讨论最优的显性与隐性激励机制.进而,在员工的组织承诺类型无法被观测的信息非对称情形下,探讨依据企业员工的不同外在特征,如风险厌恶程度、工作成本和工作能力等,选择最优的激励机制.最后,进一步考察了企业生产中依赖于人力劳动程度的高低,对员工激励机制设计产生的影响.本研究不仅在理论上完善和拓展了传统委托代理理论,也从组织行为学视角为切实解决企业员工激励问题提供了新的思路与对策.
통과건립수학모형,재전통위탁대리이론기출상,장조직승낙납입기업원공격려궤제연구.수선,재원공적조직승낙류형가피관측적신식대칭정형하,토론최우적현성여은성격려궤제.진이,재원공적조직승낙류형무법피관측적신식비대칭정형하,탐토의거기업원공적불동외재특정,여풍험염악정도、공작성본화공작능력등,선택최우적격려궤제.최후,진일보고찰료기업생산중의뢰우인력노동정도적고저,대원공격려궤제설계산생적영향.본연구불부재이론상완선화탁전료전통위탁대리이론,야종조직행위학시각위절실해결기업원공격려문제제공료신적사로여대책.
By setting up mathematical models, this paper puts the organizational commitment theory into the study of explicit and implicit incentive mechanism of enterprises .Firstly, the paper designs the incentive mechanism of enterprises according to the type of their organizational commitment under the symmetric information condition . Secondly, under the asymmetric information condition , the paper researches the explicit and implicit incentive mechanism of enterprises according to their external feature , such as the risk preference , the cost of the job, the working ability.Finally, the paper further reviews the impact of the level of enterprise production depending on hu -man labor on the design of incentive mechanism .This research not only improves the standard principle -agent theo-ry, but also provides new ideas and countermeasures for solving the incentive problems of enterprises .