华东经济管理
華東經濟管理
화동경제관리
EAST CHINA ECONOMIC MANAGEMENT
2013年
4期
164-167
,共4页
国际竞争%劳动价值论%溢出价值%补偿价值%子博弈完美纳什均衡
國際競爭%勞動價值論%溢齣價值%補償價值%子博弈完美納什均衡
국제경쟁%노동개치론%일출개치%보상개치%자박혁완미납십균형
international competition%labor value%overflow value%compensation value%subgame perfect Nash equilibrium
文章在劳动价值论的基础上,对不同发展程度国家的企业竞争的动态博弈分析证明,存在使这些国家社会福利最大化的最优竞争条件.这意味着这些国家都可以通过影响本国企业的国际生产行为,实现国际竞争的利益双赢.
文章在勞動價值論的基礎上,對不同髮展程度國傢的企業競爭的動態博弈分析證明,存在使這些國傢社會福利最大化的最優競爭條件.這意味著這些國傢都可以通過影響本國企業的國際生產行為,實現國際競爭的利益雙贏.
문장재노동개치론적기출상,대불동발전정도국가적기업경쟁적동태박혁분석증명,존재사저사국가사회복리최대화적최우경쟁조건.저의미착저사국가도가이통과영향본국기업적국제생산행위,실현국제경쟁적이익쌍영.
The competition among enterprises between developing countries and developed countries is helpful for efficiency dis?tribution of resources of these countries in the world market,but it may also reduce their social welfare.According to labor val?ue theory,using the dynamic game method,the paper analyses the type of competition,then proves the existence of the opti?mal conditions of international competition maximizing these countries’ social welfare.This means that governments could in?tervene the international production behavior of enterprises in their own countries,then it will realize a win-win benefits in in?ternational competition between developed and developing countries.