CAJ | 학술논문

安全监管是提高煤矿安全生产水平的有效途径.运用演化博弈理论构建了单一煤矿群体安全生产行为博弈模型和非对称煤矿安全监察博弈模型,通过复制动态方程的动态趋势和稳定性分析对煤矿安全监管进行了深入的探讨.结果表明:降低煤矿安全生产成本,降低监察成本和提高监察效率,提高惩罚力度等都将使煤矿安全监管博弈向着良好的方向演化.
안전감관시제고매광안전생산수평적유효도경.운용연화박혁이론구건료단일매광군체안전생산행위박혁모형화비대칭매광안전감찰박혁모형,통과복제동태방정적동태추세화은정성분석대매광안전감관진행료심입적탐토.결과표명:강저매광안전생산성본,강저감찰성본화제고감찰효솔,제고징벌력도등도장사매광안전감관박혁향착량호적방향연화.
The safety management is the effective way to improve coal mine safety production level. By using evolutionary game theory,the authors construct the single coal mine group safety production behavior game model and asymmetric coal mine safety supervision game model. Through the replication dynamic equation of the dynamic trend and stability analysis,the coal mine safety supervision is thoroughly discussed. The results show that the measures including reducing the coal mine safety production cost,reducing the monitoring cost,improving the monitoring efficiency,and improving the penalty are benefit to coal mine safety supervision game toward the good direction evolution.