CAJ | 학술논문

针对目前我国农户加入“农超对接”供应链意愿不足这一现实问题,首先,分析“农超对接”供应链的不完全契约特征;其次,构建了三种不同治理模式的数学模型,对比农户最优专用性投资水平的差异;最后,建立事后再协商的讨价还价动态博弈模型,研究影响农户专业性投资水平的因素.研究表明:以激励农户提高专用性投资水平作为标准,事后再协商模式将比事后不协商模式更具优势;如果农户预期到自己在事后再协商中会面临被“敲竹杠”的风险,将会降低事前的专用性投资水平;可以从改造农超双方不平衡的上下层结构关系入手,来激励农户提高专用性投资水平.
침대목전아국농호가입“농초대접”공응련의원불족저일현실문제,수선,분석“농초대접”공응련적불완전계약특정;기차,구건료삼충불동치리모식적수학모형,대비농호최우전용성투자수평적차이;최후,건립사후재협상적토개환개동태박혁모형,연구영향농호전업성투자수평적인소.연구표명:이격려농호제고전용성투자수평작위표준,사후재협상모식장비사후불협상모식경구우세;여과농호예기도자기재사후재협상중회면림피“고죽강”적풍험,장회강저사전적전용성투자수평;가이종개조농초쌍방불평형적상하층결구관계입수,래격려농호제고전용성투자수평.
@@@@Based on the problem that farmers are reluctant to join in the farmer-supermarket direct-pur-chase supply chain.Firstly, we depict the incomplete contract characteristics of the supply chain .Sec-ondly, we construct three different governance models and compare the differences of farmers ’ optimal level of specific investment.Finally; we establish the bargaining dynamic game model to analyze factors affecting farmers’ specific investment.The analysis shows that, after the re-negotiation mode has advan-tages over by motivating farmers to improve the specific investment levels as a standard .If the farmers ex-pect to face the risk of the hold-up problem afterwards, they will reduce the advance level of specific in-vestments.The farmers’ specific investment can be improved through the transformation of the imbalance relationship between upper and lower sides .