技术经济与管理研究
技術經濟與管理研究
기술경제여관리연구
TECHNOECONOMICS & MANAGEMENT RESEARCH
2013年
2期
3-6
,共4页
房地产销售%销售代理%企业管理%管理决策
房地產銷售%銷售代理%企業管理%管理決策
방지산소수%소수대리%기업관리%관리결책
Real estate sales%Sales agent%Enterprise management%Management decision
研究房地产销售代理活动中开发商和销售代理商各自的决策和行为,以设计出合理的房地产销售代理合约,从而充分激励房地产销售代理活动双方努力工作,提高房地产销售供应链的运作效率.研究表明,信息对称情况下,销售代理商风险规避,房地产销售代理合约应采用固定报酬形式,销售代理商的最优努力水平与其自身的能力水平呈正相关,与其成本系数成负相关.在信息不对称情况下,宜采用固定金额报酬加产出分成的形式.信息不对称情况下,销售代理商分享产出的比例与代理商的风险偏好程度成正相关,与外生的不确定性呈负相关,与代理商的成本系数呈负相关.同时,固定报酬金额应大于一定值,销售代理商才会接受开发商的委托.并且,信息不对称情况下代理商的工作努力水平低于信息对称情况下.
研究房地產銷售代理活動中開髮商和銷售代理商各自的決策和行為,以設計齣閤理的房地產銷售代理閤約,從而充分激勵房地產銷售代理活動雙方努力工作,提高房地產銷售供應鏈的運作效率.研究錶明,信息對稱情況下,銷售代理商風險規避,房地產銷售代理閤約應採用固定報酬形式,銷售代理商的最優努力水平與其自身的能力水平呈正相關,與其成本繫數成負相關.在信息不對稱情況下,宜採用固定金額報酬加產齣分成的形式.信息不對稱情況下,銷售代理商分享產齣的比例與代理商的風險偏好程度成正相關,與外生的不確定性呈負相關,與代理商的成本繫數呈負相關.同時,固定報酬金額應大于一定值,銷售代理商纔會接受開髮商的委託.併且,信息不對稱情況下代理商的工作努力水平低于信息對稱情況下.
연구방지산소수대리활동중개발상화소수대리상각자적결책화행위,이설계출합리적방지산소수대리합약,종이충분격려방지산소수대리활동쌍방노력공작,제고방지산소수공응련적운작효솔.연구표명,신식대칭정황하,소수대리상풍험규피,방지산소수대리합약응채용고정보수형식,소수대리상적최우노력수평여기자신적능력수평정정상관,여기성본계수성부상관.재신식불대칭정황하,의채용고정금액보수가산출분성적형식.신식불대칭정황하,소수대리상분향산출적비례여대리상적풍험편호정도성정상관,여외생적불학정성정부상관,여대리상적성본계수정부상관.동시,고정보수금액응대우일정치,소수대리상재회접수개발상적위탁.병차,신식불대칭정황하대리상적공작노력수평저우신식대칭정황하.
Through the research on the decisions and activities of real estate developers and sales agents, to design a proper sales agent agreement and consequently fully stimulate both sides of real estate sales agent activities to work hard, enhance the operational efficiency of the real estate sales supply chain. In the condition of information symmetry, risk aversion of sales agents, the fixed payment form that should be adopt in the agreement and the optimal effort level of sales agents have positive correlation with their efforts and have negative correlation with the cost coefficient. In the condition of information asymmetry, it is better to adopt the payment form as the fixed amount plus output distribution. According to the research, in the condition of information asymmetry, the share ratio of the agents has positive correlation with the agents' risk preference degree, and has negative correlation with their cost coefficient and external uncertainty. At one time, only if the fixed amount of payment is greater than a certain value, can the sales agents accept the commission of developers. Also, agent's hard working degree in the condition of information symmetry is lower than that in the condition of information symmetry.