CAJ | 학술논문

公司治理中的监督机制和激励机制是解决代理问题的基本途径和方式.大部分研究的重点都放在如何建立或改善激励机制,或者研究公司内部监督机制.然而公司治理中的治理机制并不是单独发挥作用的,而是相互作用,对公司的绩效产生影响.本文将董事会监督和总经理激励相结合构建模型,回归研究两者结合对企业绩效的综合影响,并进一步研究董事会监督与总经理激励之间的相互作用.通过实证研究发现董事长与总经理兼任情况、独立董事比例、董事会持股比例、董事会董事前三名薪酬与企业绩效并不显著,而董事会会议是显著的;总经理薪酬与企业绩效呈显著正相关关系,而总经理持股比例与企业绩效不相关;董事会监督与总经理激励是同方向变化,共同对企业绩效作用.
공사치리중적감독궤제화격려궤제시해결대리문제적기본도경화방식.대부분연구적중점도방재여하건립혹개선격려궤제,혹자연구공사내부감독궤제.연이공사치리중적치리궤제병불시단독발휘작용적,이시상호작용,대공사적적효산생영향.본문장동사회감독화총경리격려상결합구건모형,회귀연구량자결합대기업적효적종합영향,병진일보연구동사회감독여총경리격려지간적상호작용.통과실증연구발현동사장여총경리겸임정황、독립동사비례、동사회지고비례、동사회동사전삼명신수여기업적효병불현저,이동사회회의시현저적;총경리신수여기업적효정현저정상관관계,이총경리지고비례여기업적효불상관;동사회감독여총경리격려시동방향변화,공동대기업적효작용.
The corporate governance of the supervision mechanism and incentive mechanism to solve the problem of agency is the basic ways and the way. Most of the recent research focus has on how to establish and improve the incentive mechanism, or research company internal supervision mechanism. However the governance mechanism and corporate governance is not a single play a role, but the interaction, the company's performance impact. This paper will board supervision and general manager incentive combined constructing model, regression research on enterprise performance combination of comprehensive influence, and further research board supervision and the interaction between the general manager incentive. Through the empirical study found that the chairman and general manager concurrently, the proportions of the independent directors of the board of directors, the shareholding ratio of the directors of the board, the top three compensation and enterprise performance is not significant, but that the board of directors meeting is significant. The general manager compensation and enterprise performance is a significant positive correlation, and general manager shareholding proportion and enterprise performance not related. The board of directors supervision and general manager incentive is looking together in the same direction change, common to the enterprise performance function.