CAJ | 학술논문

文章为解决闭环供应链在不同市场需求时的定价策略和效率优化问题,利用博弈理论,在单周期情况下构建了非线性市场需求下的闭环供应链的数学模型.在此基础上研究了非对称信息下闭环供应链上各成员瞒报成本时的定价策略和其对各自利润的影响.研究结果表明:当制造商瞒报其生产成本时,并不能使自己的利润提高,此时零售商和闭环供应链整体的利润也不变;当零售商瞒报其成本时,会提升自己的利润,同时会使制造商的利润降低,此时系统整体的利润变化则有赖于系统参数的关系.在以后的多周期的市场行为中,相对于制造商,零售商更有瞒报成本的内在动力.
문장위해결폐배공응련재불동시장수구시적정개책략화효솔우화문제,이용박혁이론,재단주기정황하구건료비선성시장수구하적폐배공응련적수학모형.재차기출상연구료비대칭신식하폐배공응련상각성원만보성본시적정개책략화기대각자리윤적영향.연구결과표명:당제조상만보기생산성본시,병불능사자기적리윤제고,차시령수상화폐배공응련정체적리윤야불변;당령수상만보기성본시,회제승자기적리윤,동시회사제조상적리윤강저,차시계통정체적리윤변화칙유뢰우계통삼수적관계.재이후적다주기적시장행위중,상대우제조상,령수상경유만보성본적내재동력.
Aiming at the problem of pricing strategy and efficiency optimization of closed‐loop supply chain , the article used the game theory as the basic method ,built a model of closed‐loop supply chain of nonlinear demand in single‐cycle ,and researched the pricing strategy and the influence to its owner profit when the members of the closed‐loop supply chain lied about their real cost in the sense of asymmetric information on those ground .The research results indicated that when manufactures lied about their real cost ,they can’t promote their profit ,their profit and retailers’ profit keep fixed ;but when retailers do this ,they can pro‐mote their own profit and reduce manufactures’ profit ,at this moment ,the whole chain’s profit depend on the relation of system parameter .So ,contrast manufacturers ,the retailers have more inner power to lied a‐bout his real cost when they act in the multi‐cycle .