CAJ | 학술논문

论文分析了零售商主导的供应链上下游企业间的研发与广告合作行为,并比较了零售商主导和制造商主导时供应链的广告、研发投资和总利润.博弈与模拟分析揭示:零售商主导供应链时,零售商在斯坦伯格博弈均衡时的利润高于纳什均衡时,制造商在哪种博弈均衡时取得的收益更大视参数具体值而定,纳什均衡时零售商不分担制造商的研发费用;零售商主导供应链时,制造商在集中决策时的研发投入最高,零售商在何种博弈均衡时最优广告投入最高与具体参数有关;在一定条件下,零售商主导的供应链总利润更高.不同情形下的斯坦伯格博弈、纳什博弈和集中决策分析表明,渠道主导力量同时影响着供应链成员和整体运营绩效.
논문분석료령수상주도적공응련상하유기업간적연발여엄고합작행위,병비교료령수상주도화제조상주도시공응련적엄고、연발투자화총리윤.박혁여모의분석게시:령수상주도공응련시,령수상재사탄백격박혁균형시적리윤고우납십균형시,제조상재나충박혁균형시취득적수익경대시삼수구체치이정,납십균형시령수상불분담제조상적연발비용;령수상주도공응련시,제조상재집중결책시적연발투입최고,령수상재하충박혁균형시최우엄고투입최고여구체삼수유관;재일정조건하,령수상주도적공응련총리윤경고.불동정형하적사탄백격박혁、납십박혁화집중결책분석표명,거도주도역량동시영향착공응련성원화정체운영적효.
This research contributes to behavior analyses of the cooperative R&D and advertisement investment between the upstream and downstream in a retailer dominated supply chain. The paper compares the investment (advertisement, R&D) and total profit of the supply chain lead by the retailer and manufacture respectively. Combined execution of equilibria comparison and simulation reveals the retailer’s profit with herself leading Stackelberg game greater than that in Nash game, the profit of the manufacturer as a follower varying with parameters and retailer’s not sharing manufacturing R&D input cost in Nash game. Moreover, the game follower manufacturer invests most in R&D in centralized decision among all game scenarios. By contrast, maximum of optimal advertisement investment under which game equilibrium is determined by parameters, so does that for supply chain optimal R&D and advertisement investments and total profit. The exploitation of various Stackelberg, Nash games and centralized decision-making demonstrates the impact of the channel dominance on chain-wide operational performance as well as on individuals’ with scenario based comparisons.