CAJ | 학술논문

本文选取2010－2013年媒体对我国上市公司报道的数据，实证分析了媒体报道量和负面报道对现金股利政策的影响，发现媒体报道越多的公司更加倾向于发放现金股利；相对于媒体关注度低的公司，在高的媒体关注度下，媒体负面报道对上市公司现金股利政策有着更强的正向作用；媒体报道改变了上市公司的信息分布状况，在信息机制、声誉机制、行政介入的作用下，上市公司会通过改变现金股利政策来迎合舆论导向，以缓解委托代理问题。
본문선취2010－2013년매체대아국상시공사보도적수거，실증분석료매체보도량화부면보도대현금고리정책적영향，발현매체보도월다적공사경가경향우발방현금고리；상대우매체관주도저적공사，재고적매체관주도하，매체부면보도대상시공사현금고리정책유착경강적정향작용；매체보도개변료상시공사적신식분포상황，재신식궤제、성예궤제、행정개입적작용하，상시공사회통과개변현금고리정책래영합여론도향，이완해위탁대리문제。
Based on the media coverage data of Chinese listed companies from 2010 to 2013 , the paper empirically stud-ies the impact of media coverage and negative media coverage on cash dividend policy .The results indicate that media coverage influences cash dividend policy , the more media coverage the company receives , the higher cash dividend it is-sues;relative to those companies with low media coverage , companies with high media coverage tend to have a stronger relationship between cash dividend and the amount of negative public exposure .Media coverage can change the informa-tion distribution of listed firms .The firms cater to the public opinions by adjusting their cash dividend policy and relie-ving the agency problem under information mechanism , reputation mechanism and administrative intervention mecha-nism.