CAJ | 학술논문

本文使用1999-2012年中国房地产上市公司的面板数据，采用固定效应和随机效应模型实证研究了房地产上市公司治理的作用。研究发现，一般的公司治理机制，如董事会结构和股权结构与公司绩效并不相关，高管薪酬是唯一有效的公司治理机制，与公司绩效正相关。此外，高管薪酬变化与股票收益率的关系越来越紧密。总之，本文发现，房地产行业有效的公司治理机制越来越多地关系到金融市场的价格信号，这与我国政府不断推进的金融市场改革和开放是一致的。
본문사용1999-2012년중국방지산상시공사적면판수거，채용고정효응화수궤효응모형실증연구료방지산상시공사치리적작용。연구발현，일반적공사치리궤제，여동사회결구화고권결구여공사적효병불상관，고관신수시유일유효적공사치리궤제，여공사적효정상관。차외，고관신수변화여고표수익솔적관계월래월긴밀。총지，본문발현，방지산행업유효적공사치리궤제월래월다지관계도금융시장적개격신호，저여아국정부불단추진적금융시장개혁화개방시일치적。
This study uses the fixed effect and random effect models to examine the role of corporate governance in Chinese real estate firms from 1999 to 2012. We find that some usual corporate governance mechanisms, such as board independence and ownership structure, are irrelevant in explaining the performance of these firms. Executive compensation is the only effective governance mechanism and it is positively related to firm performance. Moreover, we also find that the change of executive compensation is increasingly related to past stock returns. Overall, we find that the effective corporate governance mechanism in real estate industry is increasingly related to the financial market pricing signal and consistent with the Chinese government’s continuous effort in reforming and liberalizing the market.