CAJ | 학술논문

高速公路联网收费的实现使车辆单次收费里程增长，逃费者在节省更高额过路费的诱惑下，增加了对现有联网收费系统的作弊动机。本文以减少公路运营企业因逃费造成的经济损失为目标，利用演化博弈的方法，将监管者(收费稽查员)看成博弈的一方，被监管者（司机和收费站员工）看成博弈的另一方，探讨收费稽查员监管、司机与收费站员工共谋逃费的问题，得到了稽查员选择不监管策略及司机与收费站员工选择共谋逃费策略时的复制动态方程，分析了在司机逃费罚款的机会成本等因素影响下双方的行为演化和演化稳定策略。结果表明，增强对监管者的监管和处罚力度、增加司机逃费成本、降低司机逃费少缴金额的可能性是遏制共谋逃费现象的有效途径。
고속공로련망수비적실현사차량단차수비리정증장，도비자재절성경고액과로비적유혹하，증가료대현유련망수비계통적작폐동궤。본문이감소공로운영기업인도비조성적경제손실위목표，이용연화박혁적방법，장감관자(수비계사원)간성박혁적일방，피감관자（사궤화수비참원공）간성박혁적령일방，탐토수비계사원감관、사궤여수비참원공공모도비적문제，득도료계사원선택불감관책략급사궤여수비참원공선택공모도비책략시적복제동태방정，분석료재사궤도비벌관적궤회성본등인소영향하쌍방적행위연화화연화은정책략。결과표명，증강대감관자적감관화처벌력도、증가사궤도비성본、강저사궤도비소격금액적가능성시알제공모도비현상적유효도경。
Expressway networking toll has been largely achieved, and as a result of the increase of mileage charges, the temptation of the higher toll saving increases the cheating motivation of drivers. This paper, aiming to reduce economic losses of highway enterprises caused by escaped toll, using the method of evolutionary game theory, considering inspectors, drivers and toll collectors as two party of game, explores the issue that supervision of inspectors and toll collectors choosing complicity with drivers to escape charges. The following are the replication dynamic equations of inspector rejecting monitor, and toll collectors choosing complicity with drivers to escape charges respectively, which analyzes the escape charges of driver under the influence of factors such as the opportunity cost of both evolution and evolutionary stable strategies. The results show that enhancing supervision of inspectors and penalties is an effective way to improve the phenomenon of complicity escaped toll between toll collectors and drivers.