CAJ | 학술논문

文章以恒信德律评估珠海中富收购关联方B.P.I的少数股东权益为例，分析在非公平关联交易中资产评估机构的策略选择。通过分析大股东操纵关联方掏空上市公司或利益输送，应用博弈论研究评估机构针对大股东决策所采取的相关策略。在短期内，评估机构选择与大股东合谋，但证监会对于评估机构的抽查，会约束评估机构的合谋行为。因此，证监会加大对评估机构抽查力度，加强对评估机构违法行为的处罚，是规范评估机构在关联交易中定价行为的关键。
문장이항신덕률평고주해중부수구관련방B.P.I적소수고동권익위례，분석재비공평관련교역중자산평고궤구적책략선택。통과분석대고동조종관련방도공상시공사혹이익수송，응용박혁론연구평고궤구침대대고동결책소채취적상관책략。재단기내，평고궤구선택여대고동합모，단증감회대우평고궤구적추사，회약속평고궤구적합모행위。인차，증감회가대대평고궤구추사력도，가강대평고궤구위법행위적처벌，시규범평고궤구재관련교역중정개행위적관건。
This paper selects Heng Xindelv assessed the value of minority equity of B.P.I in affiliate transaction as a case, and analyses the strategy choices of appraisal firm in affiliate transaction. The thesis researches large shareholder manipulates affiliation to tunnel the listed company or transfer benefits, uses analysis of game theory to research the assessment firm’s strategy choice about large shareholder’s decision. In a short term, the assessment would conspire with large shareholder. However, the commission would conduct random checks appraisal firm’s illegal acts and punish it. Therefore, the commission should strengthen spot check and punishment for the assessment illegal behavior, it is the key that specification of appraisal firm’ s act which prices the target goods in the affiliation legally.