CAJ | 학술논문

考虑一个客户企业与一个服务商共同努力实现服务外包项目价值的缔约问题，服务参与双方努力程度的无法验证和服务商可能拥有私有成本信息会降低服务绩效，导致服务外包失败。针对双方努力程度无法验证和服务商拥有私有信息这两类风险因素，建立甄别服务商私有信息的委托代理模型，分析非对称信息下的最优契约，刻画了合作生产性质服务外包环境特点对两类风险因素带来的不利效应的影响。研究结果表明，在服务商成本信息对称情形下，激励共享仅受合作双方的相对重要性的影响；而在服务商成本信息不对称情形下，低成本类型服务商的激励共享不变，高成本类型服务商的激励共享还与两种类型服务商的分布和成本差异相关。服务商的重要性越高，服务商私有信息带来的损失越高；服务商与客户企业的重要性相差不大时，努力程度不可验证带来的损失较高。
고필일개객호기업여일개복무상공동노력실현복무외포항목개치적체약문제，복무삼여쌍방노력정도적무법험증화복무상가능옹유사유성본신식회강저복무적효，도치복무외포실패。침대쌍방노력정도무법험증화복무상옹유사유신식저량류풍험인소，건립견별복무상사유신식적위탁대리모형，분석비대칭신식하적최우계약，각화료합작생산성질복무외포배경특점대량류풍험인소대래적불리효응적영향。연구결과표명，재복무상성본신식대칭정형하，격려공향부수합작쌍방적상대중요성적영향；이재복무상성본신식불대칭정형하，저성본류형복무상적격려공향불변，고성본류형복무상적격려공향환여량충류형복무상적분포화성본차이상관。복무상적중요성월고，복무상사유신식대래적손실월고；복무상여객호기업적중요성상차불대시，노력정도불가험증대래적손실교고。
This article analyzes the contracting issues arising in service outsourcing where the service output depends on the joint effort of a client and a vendor, and unverifiablity of their effort and vendor′s private cost information will result in poor perform-ance and failure of the outsourcing.To address these two risk factors, i.e., unverifiablity of effort and vendor′s private informa-tion, we propose a principal-agent model to reveal the private information of the vendor, and then we analyze the optimal contract under asymmetric information, at last we investigate the service environment characteristics′impact on the adverse effects of the two risk factors.The results indicate that under symmetric cost information the incentive share only depends on the relative impor-tance of the collaborative parties.However, when the vendor has private cost information, the incentive share of low cost vendor remains the same as that under symmetric information, but the incentive share of high cost vendor is affected by the distribution and cost ratio of the two type vendors.The adverse effect of vendor′s private cost information is higher when the vender plays a more important role, and the adverse effect of unverifiablity of effort is higher when the client is almost equally as important as the vendor.