管理科学
管理科學
관이과학
MANAGEMENT SCIENCES IN CHINA
2014年
6期
12-26
,共15页
股权激励%高管薪酬%薪酬差距%权益资本成本
股權激勵%高管薪酬%薪酬差距%權益資本成本
고권격려%고관신수%신수차거%권익자본성본
equity incentive%executive pay%pay gap%cost of equity capital
高管薪酬激励已成为现代公司治理的重要内容,伴随着中国股权激励机制的推行,上市公司高管薪酬结构随之发生变化,最终可能影响上市公司权益资本成本。利用基于真实数据的混合截面模型预测公司盈余,在此基础上通过GLS模型、OJN模型和GGM模型估算权益资本成本,以股权分置改革后2007年至2012年上市公司为样本,探究股改后中国上市公司股权激励对高管内部薪酬差距的影响,在这种影响下公司权益资本成本的变化。研究结果表明,股权激励计划的实施已成为高管内部薪酬差距扩大的主要因素;在股权激励作用下,高管内部薪酬差距的扩大增加企业权益资本成本;与非国有控股企业相比,国有控股企业中股权激励与高管内部薪酬差距的相互作用与权益资本成本敏感性更高。研究结论为高管薪酬激励制度的完善提供重要启示,也为投资者识别股权激励计划的实施效果提供经验证据。
高管薪酬激勵已成為現代公司治理的重要內容,伴隨著中國股權激勵機製的推行,上市公司高管薪酬結構隨之髮生變化,最終可能影響上市公司權益資本成本。利用基于真實數據的混閤截麵模型預測公司盈餘,在此基礎上通過GLS模型、OJN模型和GGM模型估算權益資本成本,以股權分置改革後2007年至2012年上市公司為樣本,探究股改後中國上市公司股權激勵對高管內部薪酬差距的影響,在這種影響下公司權益資本成本的變化。研究結果錶明,股權激勵計劃的實施已成為高管內部薪酬差距擴大的主要因素;在股權激勵作用下,高管內部薪酬差距的擴大增加企業權益資本成本;與非國有控股企業相比,國有控股企業中股權激勵與高管內部薪酬差距的相互作用與權益資本成本敏感性更高。研究結論為高管薪酬激勵製度的完善提供重要啟示,也為投資者識彆股權激勵計劃的實施效果提供經驗證據。
고관신수격려이성위현대공사치리적중요내용,반수착중국고권격려궤제적추행,상시공사고관신수결구수지발생변화,최종가능영향상시공사권익자본성본。이용기우진실수거적혼합절면모형예측공사영여,재차기출상통과GLS모형、OJN모형화GGM모형고산권익자본성본,이고권분치개혁후2007년지2012년상시공사위양본,탐구고개후중국상시공사고권격려대고관내부신수차거적영향,재저충영향하공사권익자본성본적변화。연구결과표명,고권격려계화적실시이성위고관내부신수차거확대적주요인소;재고권격려작용하,고관내부신수차거적확대증가기업권익자본성본;여비국유공고기업상비,국유공고기업중고권격려여고관내부신수차거적상호작용여권익자본성본민감성경고。연구결론위고관신수격려제도적완선제공중요계시,야위투자자식별고권격려계화적실시효과제공경험증거。
Executive compensation incentive has become an important part of modern corporate governance, along with the imple-mentation of equity incentive mechanism, the structure of executive pay in listed companies will change and these changes would affect the cost of equity capital of listed companies.Using the cross-sectional model that based on real data to forecast earnings, and then estimate the cost of equity capital through the GLS model, OJN model and GGM model, this study takes samples of lis-ted companies from 2007 to 2012 after the state share reform to explore the influence of China′s listed company equity incentive on executive internal pay gap, and discuss the changes of the cost of equity capital under this influence.The results show that the implementation of equity incentive plan has been the key factor to intensify executive internal pay gap;due to the influence of eq-uity incentive, internal executive pay gap increases the cost of equity capital;in state-owned enterprises, the interacting effect of equity incentive and internal executive pay gap has higher sensitivity with the cost of equity capital compared with effects in non-state-owned enterprises.Our study not only brings important enlightenments for the improvement of executive compensation in-centive system, also provides empirical evidence for investors on the influence of implementation of equity incentive plans.