CAJ | 학술논문

本文以2001—2012年中国上市公司中高管晋升数据为样本，分析了大股东控制权私有收益影响高管晋升效率的情况。研究表明，控制权私有收益显著降低了高管晋升与企业业绩之间的正相关关系；当上市公司所处地区外部法律环境较差或所处行业竞争较弱时，这种降低企业高管晋升效率的情况更为显著。
본문이2001—2012년중국상시공사중고관진승수거위양본，분석료대고동공제권사유수익영향고관진승효솔적정황。연구표명，공제권사유수익현저강저료고관진승여기업업적지간적정상관관계；당상시공사소처지구외부법률배경교차혹소처행업경쟁교약시，저충강저기업고관진승효솔적정황경위현저。
Based on the data of China’s A-share listed companies from 2001 to 2012,this paper investigates how the private benefits of controlling shareholder affects the efficiency of executive’s promotion.It is found that the private benefits of control effectively lessen the obvious relationship between the executive’s promotion and firm performance, especially when external legal environment is poor or trade competition level is low.