CAJ | 학술논문

假设市场上有使用传统能源的生厂商1和开发浅层地温能的生产商2,生产商1生产的产品绿色度较低,其价格也相应的较低,而生产商2生产的产品绿色度高,但价格较昂贵。基于政府补贴的角度,利用博弈论方法,建立政府和两个生产商的博弈模型。研究结果表明：随着消费者环保意识的增强,政府提高市场最低绿色度准入值,生产商2的市场份额会逐渐增加,而生产商1的市场份额会逐渐缩小,即政府提高市场最低绿色度准入值对生厂商2更有利。
가설시장상유사용전통능원적생엄상1화개발천층지온능적생산상2,생산상1생산적산품록색도교저,기개격야상응적교저,이생산상2생산적산품록색도고,단개격교앙귀。기우정부보첩적각도,이용박혁론방법,건립정부화량개생산상적박혁모형。연구결과표명：수착소비자배보의식적증강,정부제고시장최저록색도준입치,생산상2적시장빈액회축점증가,이생산상1적시장빈액회축점축소,즉정부제고시장최저록색도준입치대생엄상2경유리。
The article supposes that there are two kinds of manufacturer on the market,the manufacturer of using tra-ditional energy and shallow geothermal energy. The products of manufacturer 1 have a lower green degree,and its price is correspondingly lower. On the contrary,the green degree of the other manufacturer's price is higher,and its price is also expensive. Based on government subsidies,this paper establishes a game model by considering govern-ment and two manufactures. The result shows,with the increase of consumers' environment-care,increasing the low-est green access value is more advantage to the manufacturers of using shallow geothermal energy.