管理科学学报
管理科學學報
관이과학학보
JOURNAL OF MANAGEMENT SCIENCES IN CHINA
2014年
12期
27-37,92
,共12页
供应链管理%突变管理%横向转载%需求突变
供應鏈管理%突變管理%橫嚮轉載%需求突變
공응련관리%돌변관리%횡향전재%수구돌변
supply chain management%disruption management%lateral transshipment%demand disruption
研究了相互竞争的零售商利用横向转载策略来应对市场需求突变的问题。以两个相互竞争的零售商为研究对象,当突发事件造成市场需求发生突变时,零售商可以选择横向转载策略来应对突变需求,建立了无突变无转载、有突变无转载和有突变有转载三种情形下两零售商的非合作博弈模型,给出了博弈存在唯一纯战略纳什均衡的充分条件,证明了对称性博弈的纯战略纳什均衡解是唯一存在的,并分析了零售商在三个纳什均衡战略下的定价和安全库存的关系。进一步分析了均衡战略与零售商竞争强度系数的单调关系,并给出了横向转载策略有效应对随机需求突变的条件及其理论证据。数值算例则从计算仿真的角度对研究结论进行了验证。研究结果表明,对于相互竞争的零售商而言,利用横向转载来应对需求突变是十分有益的,零售商的期望利润在一定条件下由于横向转载的实施而实现了帕累托改进。但较低的转载价格可能会使得零售商没有激励选择横向转载策略。因而,合理确定转载价格则是利用横向转载策略应对需求突变的关键问题。这一结论为企业实施有效的应急管理措施提供理论支持。
研究瞭相互競爭的零售商利用橫嚮轉載策略來應對市場需求突變的問題。以兩箇相互競爭的零售商為研究對象,噹突髮事件造成市場需求髮生突變時,零售商可以選擇橫嚮轉載策略來應對突變需求,建立瞭無突變無轉載、有突變無轉載和有突變有轉載三種情形下兩零售商的非閤作博弈模型,給齣瞭博弈存在唯一純戰略納什均衡的充分條件,證明瞭對稱性博弈的純戰略納什均衡解是唯一存在的,併分析瞭零售商在三箇納什均衡戰略下的定價和安全庫存的關繫。進一步分析瞭均衡戰略與零售商競爭彊度繫數的單調關繫,併給齣瞭橫嚮轉載策略有效應對隨機需求突變的條件及其理論證據。數值算例則從計算倣真的角度對研究結論進行瞭驗證。研究結果錶明,對于相互競爭的零售商而言,利用橫嚮轉載來應對需求突變是十分有益的,零售商的期望利潤在一定條件下由于橫嚮轉載的實施而實現瞭帕纍託改進。但較低的轉載價格可能會使得零售商沒有激勵選擇橫嚮轉載策略。因而,閤理確定轉載價格則是利用橫嚮轉載策略應對需求突變的關鍵問題。這一結論為企業實施有效的應急管理措施提供理論支持。
연구료상호경쟁적령수상이용횡향전재책략래응대시장수구돌변적문제。이량개상호경쟁적령수상위연구대상,당돌발사건조성시장수구발생돌변시,령수상가이선택횡향전재책략래응대돌변수구,건립료무돌변무전재、유돌변무전재화유돌변유전재삼충정형하량령수상적비합작박혁모형,급출료박혁존재유일순전략납십균형적충분조건,증명료대칭성박혁적순전략납십균형해시유일존재적,병분석료령수상재삼개납십균형전략하적정개화안전고존적관계。진일보분석료균형전략여령수상경쟁강도계수적단조관계,병급출료횡향전재책략유효응대수궤수구돌변적조건급기이론증거。수치산례칙종계산방진적각도대연구결론진행료험증。연구결과표명,대우상호경쟁적령수상이언,이용횡향전재래응대수구돌변시십분유익적,령수상적기망리윤재일정조건하유우횡향전재적실시이실현료파루탁개진。단교저적전재개격가능회사득령수상몰유격려선택횡향전재책략。인이,합리학정전재개격칙시이용횡향전재책략응대수구돌변적관건문제。저일결론위기업실시유효적응급관리조시제공이론지지。
This paper studied the value of lateral transshipment policy between two competitive retailers under demand disruption environment. Considered two retailers competing for selling homogeneous products,we as-sumed that retailers can use inventory pooling strategy to mitigate customer demand risks when demands are disrupted. Thus,three non-cooperative game models are established:no disruption and no transshipment case ( NDNT),with disruption and no transshipment case( WDNT),and with disruption and with transshipment case( WDWT). Through a contraction mapping theory,we developed sufficient conditions for the Nash equi-librium to be existent and unique. We proved that each game of the three cases has a single pure strategy Nash equilibrium at symmetric configuration. Furthermore,we analyzed properties of the equilibrium and compared it with the other one. We also analyzed the monotone relationships of the competition degree parameters to the equilibriums based on solutions of partial derivatives equations and developed sufficient conditions that the transshipment policy is beneficial to the retailers. Through computation and simulation of a numerical exam-ple,we verified these conclusions. It is shown that retailers are always benefited from lateral transshipment when demands are disrupted because expected revenue will realize Pareto improvement after transshipment. However,relatively low transshipment prices will make retailers hurt by transshipment. Therefore,transship-ment price configuration plays a key role in managing demand disruptions with transshipment. The results will provide theoretical supports for entities regarding disruption management.