管理科学学报
管理科學學報
관이과학학보
JOURNAL OF MANAGEMENT SCIENCES IN CHINA
2014年
12期
15-26
,共12页
吴庆%但斌%钱宇%唐小我
吳慶%但斌%錢宇%唐小我
오경%단빈%전우%당소아
第3方物流%合同设计%博弈%协调%易逝品
第3方物流%閤同設計%博弈%協調%易逝品
제3방물류%합동설계%박혁%협조%역서품
third party logistics%contract design%game%coordination%perishable product
对于一类低值易逝品,损耗与物流服务价格是影响这类产品订购与销售价格决策的重要影响因素。主要研究了第3方物流服务提供商的努力水平会影响到客户企业产品的数量和质量损耗情形下的物流外包渠道优化与协调问题。通过建立动态博弈模型,分析了传统交易价格合同下双方的决策行为,结果表明双方的决策冲突会导致产品订购量和销售价格的扭曲,但不存在努力水平的扭曲,进而会导致次优渠道绩效。为了解决这一问题,设计了收入共享与努力成本共担合同,并论证了在一定条件下这一合同可以实现渠道协调、双方共赢。最后,相应的算例表明努力水平影响产品质量和数量损耗的程度会对双方、集中式系统的决策行为和绩效产生重要的影响。
對于一類低值易逝品,損耗與物流服務價格是影響這類產品訂購與銷售價格決策的重要影響因素。主要研究瞭第3方物流服務提供商的努力水平會影響到客戶企業產品的數量和質量損耗情形下的物流外包渠道優化與協調問題。通過建立動態博弈模型,分析瞭傳統交易價格閤同下雙方的決策行為,結果錶明雙方的決策遲突會導緻產品訂購量和銷售價格的扭麯,但不存在努力水平的扭麯,進而會導緻次優渠道績效。為瞭解決這一問題,設計瞭收入共享與努力成本共擔閤同,併論證瞭在一定條件下這一閤同可以實現渠道協調、雙方共贏。最後,相應的算例錶明努力水平影響產品質量和數量損耗的程度會對雙方、集中式繫統的決策行為和績效產生重要的影響。
대우일류저치역서품,손모여물류복무개격시영향저류산품정구여소수개격결책적중요영향인소。주요연구료제3방물류복무제공상적노력수평회영향도객호기업산품적수량화질량손모정형하적물류외포거도우화여협조문제。통과건립동태박혁모형,분석료전통교역개격합동하쌍방적결책행위,결과표명쌍방적결책충돌회도치산품정구량화소수개격적뉴곡,단불존재노력수평적뉴곡,진이회도치차우거도적효。위료해결저일문제,설계료수입공향여노력성본공담합동,병론증료재일정조건하저일합동가이실현거도협조、쌍방공영。최후,상응적산례표명노력수평영향산품질량화수량손모적정도회대쌍방、집중식계통적결책행위화적효산생중요적영향。
For a low value perishable product,product losses in the logistics process and logistics service prices have important influences on the decisions of both order and selling price. This paper focuses on the op-timization and coordination problems in an outsourcing logistics channel where the quantity and quality losses of a client enterprise’s product depend on the logistics effort levels selected by a Third Party Logistics Service Provider( TPLSP). A dynamic game model is established to analyze the decision conflicts under a traditional unit pricing contract where the TPLSP sets logistics effort levels and service prices,and the client enterprise chooses the product order quantity and selling prices. Results show that the decision conflicts lead to distor-tions of both order quantity and selling price,and further result in suboptimal channel performance,but do not cause effort level distortions. To resolve the problem,a revenue and effort cost sharing contract is designed and the contract terms to achieve perfect channel coordination and a win-win outcome are identified. Finally, computational studies show the effects of effort levels on the product’s quantity and quality losses have impor-tant influences on the decisions of each firm and the integrated system,and the channel performances.