CAJ | 학술논문

致力于推动理想低碳运营模式演化，利用演化博弈的理论和方法，将政府、制造企业和消费者三个利益相关主体纳入演化博弈分析框架，探索低碳经济背景下各主体决策的演化路径和演化规律。策略稳定性分析和仿真实验表明：企业低碳决策演化是各利益相关主体博弈互动的结果；降低低碳监管成本、加大低碳规制惩罚力度、提高全民低碳心理意识等措施有助于推动理想低碳运营模式演化；低碳经济下不存在“政府放任企业传统生产”或“消费者钟情企业高碳产品”的演化稳态。
치력우추동이상저탄운영모식연화，이용연화박혁적이론화방법，장정부、제조기업화소비자삼개이익상관주체납입연화박혁분석광가，탐색저탄경제배경하각주체결책적연화로경화연화규률。책략은정성분석화방진실험표명：기업저탄결책연화시각이익상관주체박혁호동적결과；강저저탄감관성본、가대저탄규제징벌력도、제고전민저탄심리의식등조시유조우추동이상저탄운영모식연화；저탄경제하불존재“정부방임기업전통생산”혹“소비자종정기업고탄산품”적연화은태。
In order to promote the evolution of the ideal low-carbon operating mode , we use the theory and meth-od of evolutionary game , build an evolutionary game framework which contains the governments , manufacting en-terprises and consumers , discuss the evolution path and regulation of their decisions under low -carbon economy . The stability analysis and simulation show that enterprise ’ s evolution path on low-carbon decision is impacted on by parties concerned .The measures such as the decrease of the cost of low carbon regulation , the increase of the intensity of punishment for illegal enterprises , the raising of consumer ’ s awareness of low carbon can promote the evolution of the ideal mode .Under the background of low-carbon economy , there will not have an evolution steady state in which enterprises choose traditional mode while the governments don ’ t supervise , or consumers always prefer high-carbon products which produced by enterprises .