商业研究
商業研究
상업연구
COMMERCIAL RESEARCH
2015年
1期
53-61
,共9页
定向增发%分析师利益冲突%投资评级%盈利预测
定嚮增髮%分析師利益遲突%投資評級%盈利預測
정향증발%분석사이익충돌%투자평급%영리예측
Equity Private Placement%analysts′conflicts of interest%stock recommendation%earnings forecast
本文以2006－2013年项目融资和配套融资为目的的定向增发上市公司为研究对象，实证考察了定向增发预案公告前后12个月和定增股份锁定期内承销商分析师和非承销商分析师在投资评级以及盈利预测上的差异。研究发现，相比于非承销商分析师，承销商分析师在预案公告前12个月体现出更为乐观的评级建议，预案公告后12个月，承销商分析师仍然表现得更加乐观，并且盈利预测偏误与绝对误差要显著大于非承销商分析师水平；对锁定期的分析发现承销商分析师在评级建议和盈利预测上都表现得更加乐观，而且对于期间股价表现不佳的定增个股的盈利预测更加激进，这种现象是由于承销商分析师利益冲突所致：预案公告前后是取悦上市公司管理层，锁定期则是维护机构投资者利益。
本文以2006－2013年項目融資和配套融資為目的的定嚮增髮上市公司為研究對象，實證攷察瞭定嚮增髮預案公告前後12箇月和定增股份鎖定期內承銷商分析師和非承銷商分析師在投資評級以及盈利預測上的差異。研究髮現，相比于非承銷商分析師，承銷商分析師在預案公告前12箇月體現齣更為樂觀的評級建議，預案公告後12箇月，承銷商分析師仍然錶現得更加樂觀，併且盈利預測偏誤與絕對誤差要顯著大于非承銷商分析師水平；對鎖定期的分析髮現承銷商分析師在評級建議和盈利預測上都錶現得更加樂觀，而且對于期間股價錶現不佳的定增箇股的盈利預測更加激進，這種現象是由于承銷商分析師利益遲突所緻：預案公告前後是取悅上市公司管理層，鎖定期則是維護機構投資者利益。
본문이2006－2013년항목융자화배투융자위목적적정향증발상시공사위연구대상，실증고찰료정향증발예안공고전후12개월화정증고빈쇄정기내승소상분석사화비승소상분석사재투자평급이급영리예측상적차이。연구발현，상비우비승소상분석사，승소상분석사재예안공고전12개월체현출경위악관적평급건의，예안공고후12개월，승소상분석사잉연표현득경가악관，병차영리예측편오여절대오차요현저대우비승소상분석사수평；대쇄정기적분석발현승소상분석사재평급건의화영리예측상도표현득경가악관，이차대우기간고개표현불가적정증개고적영리예측경가격진，저충현상시유우승소상분석사이익충돌소치：예안공고전후시취열상시공사관리층，쇄정기칙시유호궤구투자자이익。
Based on equity private placements which were identified as project financing and supporting financing from 2006 to 2013, this paper investigates the differences on stock recommendations and earnings forecasts between affiliated analysts and unaffiliated analysts in the 12 months before and after the announcement date of equity private placements as well as in the lockup period.Compared to unaffiliated analysts, the recommendations of affiliated analysts were more op-timistic in the 12 months before and after the announcement date of the private placements, the earnings forecasts of affil-iated analysts were more optimistic in the 12 months after the announcement date of the equity private placements, both in predictive bias and error.Further analysis on the lockup period discovers that affiliated analysts were more positive on issuing optimistic recommendations and earnings forecasts, especially for firms with poor aftermarket performances.We believe it is the result of conflicts of interest:affiliated analysts had to please the management of listed companies before the announcement date of private placements, however, they faced more pressure from the institutional investors during the lockup period.
