CAJ | 학술논문

本文以2002—2011年716家上市公司为样本，在动态内生性的框架下，运用动态面板的System GMM估计方法，以动态性视角研究了管理层薪酬激励与公司风险承担间的关系。研究发现：管理层薪酬激励与公司风险承担间存在动态内生性问题，不仅当期管理层薪酬激励对当期公司风险承担有显著的影响，而且前期管理层薪酬激励也对当期公司风险承担有显著的影响，并且两种薪酬激励方式对公司风险承担的影响方向相反。此外，前期公司风险承担对当期管理层薪酬有反馈效应。
본문이2002—2011년716가상시공사위양본，재동태내생성적광가하，운용동태면판적System GMM고계방법，이동태성시각연구료관리층신수격려여공사풍험승담간적관계。연구발현：관리층신수격려여공사풍험승담간존재동태내생성문제，불부당기관리층신수격려대당기공사풍험승담유현저적영향，이차전기관리층신수격려야대당기공사풍험승담유현저적영향，병차량충신수격려방식대공사풍험승담적영향방향상반。차외，전기공사풍험승담대당기관리층신수유반궤효응。
In this paper,716 listed companies range from 2002 to 2011 are used as our sample. In the framework of dynamic endogeneity,we use the dynamic System GMM model,based on a dynamic perspective to study the rela-tionship between managerial compensation incentives and corporate risk-taking. And we get the following results:There is dynamic endogeneity problem between managerial compensation and corporate risk-taking, not only current managerial compensation incentives has a significant effect on the corporate risk-taking, but also previous managerial compensation incentives has a significant effect on the corporate risk-taking,and two kinds of compensation incentives has a contrary effect on the corporate risk-taking. Besides,previous corporate risk-taking has a feedback effects on cur-rent managerial compensation.