CAJ | 학술논문

本文基于1999－2012年中国上市公司的研究样本，考察了债务融资和经理激励对企业投资不足影响的作用机制。实证结果表明，债务融资和经理薪酬均有助于降低公司的投资不足行为，二者对投资不足的联合效应表现为替代关系，负债率较高的公司采用相对较低的经理薪酬就可以起到缓解投资不足的效果。我们进一步按企业所在地的金融发展水平和企业产权性质进行分组后，发现负债与经理薪酬对投资不足的影响效应表现略有不同。此外，我们实证得到经理持股和期权激励可以显著约束到公司投资不足行为。
본문기우1999－2012년중국상시공사적연구양본，고찰료채무융자화경리격려대기업투자불족영향적작용궤제。실증결과표명，채무융자화경리신수균유조우강저공사적투자불족행위，이자대투자불족적연합효응표현위체대관계，부채솔교고적공사채용상대교저적경리신수취가이기도완해투자불족적효과。아문진일보안기업소재지적금융발전수평화기업산권성질진행분조후，발현부채여경리신수대투자불족적영향효응표현략유불동。차외，아문실증득도경리지고화기권격려가이현저약속도공사투자불족행위。
Based on the data of Chinese listed firms from 1999 to 2012 , this paper discusses how the debt and executive compensation interact to the under-investment.It shows that the debt and manager incentive could reduce the under-investment.There is substitution relationship between the leverage and executive incentive for the companies'under -investment.We conduct a thorough study considering the level of financial development and the firms'property rights.In addition, we also investigate how Stockholder's rights drive affect the under-investment.