CAJ | 학술논문

中国历朝驿传和漕运体系相同的崩溃形态是受制于公共部门扩大陷阱演化规律的深层次制度问题。公共选择学之寻租理论揭示了公共部门扩大陷阱的诱致原因，即公共部门创立后，不同的公共部门之间以及公共部门与私营部门之间，始终存在着对资源的占有、控制、收益等的博弈。在支出政策选择上，政治家总是倾向于扩大规模，扩大开支，以满足持续性地维护特定群体的利益并得到其支持的目的。这种博弈过程总是很快地走向负和博弈，日益造成巨大的社会成本，并不可逆转。
중국력조역전화조운체계상동적붕궤형태시수제우공공부문확대함정연화규률적심층차제도문제。공공선택학지심조이론게시료공공부문확대함정적유치원인，즉공공부문창립후，불동적공공부문지간이급공공부문여사영부문지간，시종존재착대자원적점유、공제、수익등적박혁。재지출정책선택상，정치가총시경향우확대규모，확대개지，이만족지속성지유호특정군체적이익병득도기지지적목적。저충박혁과정총시흔쾌지주향부화박혁，일익조성거대적사회성본，병불가역전。
The same form of collapse of China's every dynasty's postal system and water transportation system is subject to deep-seated problems of public sector expand trap evolution law system. Rent-seeking theory of public choice study reveals that reasons of the public sector to expand the induced trap are there always exist resources possession, control, and proceeds of the game after the public sector founded, among different public sectors and between public sector and private sector. On spending policy choice, politicians have a tendency to expand scale and spending, in order to meet the interests of specific groups and get their support in protecting constantly. This kind of game process always goes negative game, and quickly cause huge social costs, and irreversible.