财经理论与实践
財經理論與實踐
재경이론여실천
THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF FINANCE AND ECONOMICS
2015年
1期
100-104
,共5页
环境治理%利益博弈%机制设计
環境治理%利益博弈%機製設計
배경치리%이익박혁%궤제설계
Environmental governance%Game of interest%Mechanism design
在环境治理中，中央政府和地方政府作为“经济人”为争取自身利益最大化展开竞争博弈，效用目标差异是导致其竞争的根本原因。为实现双方互利共赢的帕累托最优，应设计相应的激励机制以实现地方政府从竞争走向合作，实现地方利益与区域利益的统一，经济增长和环境协调一致，促进社会可持续发展。
在環境治理中，中央政府和地方政府作為“經濟人”為爭取自身利益最大化展開競爭博弈，效用目標差異是導緻其競爭的根本原因。為實現雙方互利共贏的帕纍託最優，應設計相應的激勵機製以實現地方政府從競爭走嚮閤作，實現地方利益與區域利益的統一，經濟增長和環境協調一緻，促進社會可持續髮展。
재배경치리중，중앙정부화지방정부작위“경제인”위쟁취자신이익최대화전개경쟁박혁，효용목표차이시도치기경쟁적근본원인。위실현쌍방호리공영적파루탁최우，응설계상응적격려궤제이실현지방정부종경쟁주향합작，실현지방이익여구역이익적통일，경제증장화배경협조일치，촉진사회가지속발전。
In environmental governance,the central government and the local government ac-ted as an"economic man"for the maximization of their own interests to compete in the game.U-tility goal difference is the fundamental cause of its competition.In order to achieve a win-win as the Pareto optimum,we design a corresponding incentive mechanism to realize the local gov-ernment from competition to cooperation,the unity of local interests and regional interests,coor-dination of economic growth and the environment,and promote the sustainable development of society.
