CAJ | 학술논문

以2009~2012年沪深 A 股上市公司为样本，从企业发展动态的角度检验非效率投资的影响动因。研究表明：成长期和成熟期上市公司的过度投资行为由管理者代理冲突所致，衰退期国有企业的过度投资由大股东代理矛盾所致，非国有企业的过度投资行为由管理者代理冲突和大股东代理矛盾共同所致；成长期上市公司投资不足主要由融资约束所致，成熟期和衰退期公司投资不足由融资约束和两类代理冲突共同所致，且非国有公司比国有公司面临更加严格的融资约束。
이2009~2012년호심 A 고상시공사위양본，종기업발전동태적각도검험비효솔투자적영향동인。연구표명：성장기화성숙기상시공사적과도투자행위유관리자대리충돌소치，쇠퇴기국유기업적과도투자유대고동대리모순소치，비국유기업적과도투자행위유관리자대리충돌화대고동대리모순공동소치；성장기상시공사투자불족주요유융자약속소치，성숙기화쇠퇴기공사투자불족유융자약속화량류대리충돌공동소치，차비국유공사비국유공사면림경가엄격적융자약속。
The paper examines the motivation of inefficient investment from the perspective of business dynamic development,based on the sample of 2009 -2012 A-share listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges.The results show that:A company's over-investment in growth and maturity stage is caused by the conflict of manager agent;over-investment in state-owned enterprises in recession stage is caused by major shareholder proxy conflicts;over-invest-ment in non-state-owned enterprises in recession stage is caused by both manager agency conflicts and major shareholder agency conflicts;under-investment of listed companies in growth stage is caused by financing constraints;under-investment of listed companies in maturity and recession stage is caused by both financing constraints and the two types of agency conflicts,and non-state-owned companies face more financing constraints than state-owned companies.