预测
預測
예측
FORECASTING
2015年
1期
70-75,65
,共7页
CVaR风险度量准则%顾客策略行为%收益共享契约%供应链协调%帕累托最优准则
CVaR風險度量準則%顧客策略行為%收益共享契約%供應鏈協調%帕纍託最優準則
CVaR풍험도량준칙%고객책략행위%수익공향계약%공응련협조%파루탁최우준칙
CVaR criteria%strategic customer behavior%revenue sharing contract%supply chain coordination%Pareto optimal criterion
本文构建了顾客策略行为下基于CVaR风险度量准则及收益共享契约的供应链决策模型。分析了集中式和分散式供应链系统中,风险规避的供应链成员企业的最优决策行为。采用群决策理论,探讨了收益共享契约的协调机制和利润的分配机制。研究表明:第一,顾客策略行为下,产品的最优零售价格可以起到平衡供应链的利润与风险的杠杆作用;第二,当零售商和制造商的风险规避度不等时,基于帕累托最优准则的收益共享契约可以使分散式供应链达到协调,但不能实现渠道利润在成员企业间的任意分配,各成员企业获得的最终利润取决于他们的相对风险规避度和在供应链中的影响力;第三,基于帕累托最优准则的收益共享契约能够平衡供应链成员企业间的利润与风险。
本文構建瞭顧客策略行為下基于CVaR風險度量準則及收益共享契約的供應鏈決策模型。分析瞭集中式和分散式供應鏈繫統中,風險規避的供應鏈成員企業的最優決策行為。採用群決策理論,探討瞭收益共享契約的協調機製和利潤的分配機製。研究錶明:第一,顧客策略行為下,產品的最優零售價格可以起到平衡供應鏈的利潤與風險的槓桿作用;第二,噹零售商和製造商的風險規避度不等時,基于帕纍託最優準則的收益共享契約可以使分散式供應鏈達到協調,但不能實現渠道利潤在成員企業間的任意分配,各成員企業穫得的最終利潤取決于他們的相對風險規避度和在供應鏈中的影響力;第三,基于帕纍託最優準則的收益共享契約能夠平衡供應鏈成員企業間的利潤與風險。
본문구건료고객책략행위하기우CVaR풍험도량준칙급수익공향계약적공응련결책모형。분석료집중식화분산식공응련계통중,풍험규피적공응련성원기업적최우결책행위。채용군결책이론,탐토료수익공향계약적협조궤제화리윤적분배궤제。연구표명:제일,고객책략행위하,산품적최우령수개격가이기도평형공응련적리윤여풍험적강간작용;제이,당령수상화제조상적풍험규피도불등시,기우파루탁최우준칙적수익공향계약가이사분산식공응련체도협조,단불능실현거도리윤재성원기업간적임의분배,각성원기업획득적최종리윤취결우타문적상대풍험규피도화재공응련중적영향력;제삼,기우파루탁최우준칙적수익공향계약능구평형공응련성원기업간적리윤여풍험。
The supply chain decision model considering strategic customer behavior is proposed based on revenue sharing contract. In a conditional value-at-risk framework, the optimal decision making behavior of centralized and decentralized supply chain are analyzed when supply chain members are both risk-averse. In addition, coordination mechanism as well as channel profit allocation between supply chain members are discussed based on group decision theory. The results are as follows. Firstly, the optimal retail price becomes endogenous and can be a good tool to balance the system’ s profit and risk to a certain extent when there are a large number of strategic customers. Secondly, the revenue sharing contract based on Pareto optimal criterion can coordinate the decentralized supply chain, but the channel profit cannot be alloca-ted arbitrarily between members in this contract when the risk-aversion of members is not equal. The final profits of the members depend not only on relative risk-aversion of members but also on their own influence powers in supply chain. Finally, the revenue sharing contract based on Pareto optimal criterion can balance the profits and the risks between supply chain members.