CAJ | 학술논문

基于“农业合作社＋加工企业＋零售商”的农产品供应链模式，运用 Stackelberg 博弈分析和Shapley值法以及修正后的Shapley值法研究“合作社主导型农产品供应链”联盟中各主体的利益分配，并引入模拟数值进行实证分析，结果表明：修正后的Shapley值分配方法使农业合作社得到了高于基础收益的分配额，而加工企业和零售商所得利益则比修正之前少；这种联盟关系体现了按贡献分配利益的原则，更符合实际，且仍然是稳定的。因此，可以通过修正后的Shapley值法设计合理的利益共享契约，以维持农产品供应链联盟关系的稳定性。
기우“농업합작사＋가공기업＋령수상”적농산품공응련모식，운용 Stackelberg 박혁분석화Shapley치법이급수정후적Shapley치법연구“합작사주도형농산품공응련”련맹중각주체적이익분배，병인입모의수치진행실증분석，결과표명：수정후적Shapley치분배방법사농업합작사득도료고우기출수익적분배액，이가공기업화령수상소득이익칙비수정지전소；저충련맹관계체현료안공헌분배이익적원칙，경부합실제，차잉연시은정적。인차，가이통과수정후적Shapley치법설계합리적이익공향계약，이유지농산품공응련련맹관계적은정성。
Based on the agricultural products supply chain pattern of “agricultural cooperatives + processors +retailers”, the paper proposes the concept of “cooperative?led agricultural supply chain” for the first time. By the Stackelberg game theory, Shapley value and modified Shapley value, the paper analyzes the profit allocation for each subject in the alliance. Furthermore, the paper introduces empirical values and proposes reasonable profit allocation of each subject in the alliance. The results show that by modified Shapley value method the agricultural cooperative gets more profit than the basic profit allocation, while the processor and retailer get less profit, but the relationship among the alliance is still stable because the principal of allocation depending on contribution is applied. Based on the analysis above, reasonable profit?sharing contract can be designed by modified Shapley value to maintain stable agricultural products supply chain alliance.