CAJ | 학술논문

科技型中小企业对资金需求迫切、经营效益不确定，根据其自身特点和融资诉求以及信息不对称和信息不完全所导致的逆向选择风险，文章基于理论推导模型，分析了科技型中小企业、银行与风险投资机构三者之间的委托代理关系。从商业银行与风险投资机构两个角度研究融资选择问题，在与银行、风险投资等金融机构开展信用交易时，所引发的资信风险贯穿于企业发展的整个过程，并成为制约金融机构向其提供融资服务的基本原因。通过理论推导发现，当银行与风险投资机构共同为企业提供资金时，企业成功概率比前两者单独为企业提供资金时都要高，企业违约率也最低。研究结果不仅为科技型中小企业的融资选择提供了依据，也为将来银行与风险投资之间的合作提供理论参考。
과기형중소기업대자금수구박절、경영효익불학정，근거기자신특점화융자소구이급신식불대칭화신식불완전소도치적역향선택풍험，문장기우이론추도모형，분석료과기형중소기업、은행여풍험투자궤구삼자지간적위탁대리관계。종상업은행여풍험투자궤구량개각도연구융자선택문제，재여은행、풍험투자등금융궤구개전신용교역시，소인발적자신풍험관천우기업발전적정개과정，병성위제약금융궤구향기제공융자복무적기본원인。통과이론추도발현，당은행여풍험투자궤구공동위기업제공자금시，기업성공개솔비전량자단독위기업제공자금시도요고，기업위약솔야최저。연구결과불부위과기형중소기업적융자선택제공료의거，야위장래은행여풍험투자지간적합작제공이론삼고。
Science and technology based enterprises require large capital and their operating efficiency is uncertain in the developing process. In accordance with the characteristics and financing demands of the small and medium-sized enterprises and adverse selection risk caused by the information asymmetry and incomplete information, the paper analyzes the principal-agent relationship among high-tech small and medium-sized enterprises, banks and venture capital institutions. The paper studies the financing selection from the perspective of commercial banks and venture capital institutions. When the credit transaction is carried out between banks, venture capital institutions and small and medium enterprises based science and technology, the credit risk caused by it will always run through the whole developing process of small and medium-sized enterprises and restrict financial institutions to provide financing services. Theoretical analysis shows that when the banks and venture capital institutions both provide funds for the enterprise, the probability of business success is higher and at the same time default rate is the lowest. The results of this study provide the basis for SMEs based on science and technology in financing options and also provide the theoretical references for the cooperation between them and banks and venture capital institutions.