CAJ | 학술논문

在重复囚徒困境博弈中，同样结构的博弈被反复地进行，参与者的最佳策略选择主要依赖于对手可能采取的策略和他们对抵赖和坦白如何作出选择。有限次重复博弈在决策行动时一般使用逆向归纳法，即从重复博弈的最后一个回合开始往前推理从而决定每一步的选择。在无限次重复博弈中，对于任何一个参与者的欺骗和违约行为，其他参与者总会有机会给予报复。
재중복수도곤경박혁중，동양결구적박혁피반복지진행，삼여자적최가책략선택주요의뢰우대수가능채취적책략화타문대저뢰화탄백여하작출선택。유한차중복박혁재결책행동시일반사용역향귀납법，즉종중복박혁적최후일개회합개시왕전추리종이결정매일보적선택。재무한차중복박혁중，대우임하일개삼여자적기편화위약행위，기타삼여자총회유궤회급여보복。
Since the game with same structure is carried out repeatedly in the repeated prisoner's dilem-ma game, the best strategy of participants mainly depends on the strategy that the opponent may adopt and their choice to denial and frank. Finite repeated game use generally backward induction in the decision-making ac-tion, namely from the last round of repeated game started forward reasoning to determine every step of the se-lection. In the repeated infinitely game, the other participants will have opportunity to give revenge for any one participant fraud and breach.