CAJ | 학술논문

以基本的“收益共享契约”为基础，以集中控制型VMI＆TPL模式为对象，研究供应链上游段各成员企业的协调。由于基本的收益共享契约不能对供应链进行有效协调，提出了基于风险共担的收益共享契约，但是该契约不能实现供应链各成员的期望收益的帕累托最优。为了改进这一缺陷，建立了基于不对称的Nash协商的风险共担型的收益共享契约模型。分析表明：该模型不仅克服了不能实现供应链各成员的期望收益达到帕累托最优的缺点，还可以实现各参与企业的期望收益的帕累托最优。
이기본적“수익공향계약”위기출，이집중공제형VMI＆TPL모식위대상，연구공응련상유단각성원기업적협조。유우기본적수익공향계약불능대공응련진행유효협조，제출료기우풍험공담적수익공향계약，단시해계약불능실현공응련각성원적기망수익적파루탁최우。위료개진저일결함，건립료기우불대칭적Nash협상적풍험공담형적수익공향계약모형。분석표명：해모형불부극복료불능실현공응련각성원적기망수익체도파루탁최우적결점，환가이실현각삼여기업적기망수익적파루탁최우。
Based on revenue sharing ( RS) contract, the coordination about upstream of the centralized VMI &TPL supply chain is studied .Because the RS contract failure to coordinate the supply chain , an RS contract of risk-sharing is put forward .However , the contract cannot guarantee optimal Pareto of profit im-plementation about the member enterprises of supply chain .Finally, the contract is further extended to the RS contract of risk-sharing on basis of asymmetric Nash negotiation .Research shows that the contract can not only ensure the whole profit to achieve optimal Pareto , but it can also arrive at the optimal Pareto of revenue of all members .