CAJ | 학술논문

将行为人涉他偏好（嫉妒和自豪）因素引入地方官员政治晋升博弈模型中，考察了其对地方官员行为的影响。结果显示：涉他偏好对地方官员产生了更高的先验激励，在加剧同级官员之间竞争、促使地方官员付出更多努力的同时，还改变了社会福利水平和地方官员对区域合作抑或分割的行为选择；处于竞争劣势的官员会在维持发展型努力的同时采取“攫取之手”并提高其保留效用；地方官员在合作时倾向于同所辖区域发展水平相差较大的区域，而非发展水平相近的区域。
장행위인섭타편호（질투화자호）인소인입지방관원정치진승박혁모형중，고찰료기대지방관원행위적영향。결과현시：섭타편호대지방관원산생료경고적선험격려，재가극동급관원지간경쟁、촉사지방관원부출경다노력적동시，환개변료사회복이수평화지방관원대구역합작억혹분할적행위선택；처우경쟁열세적관원회재유지발전형노력적동시채취“확취지수”병제고기보류효용；지방관원재합작시경향우동소할구역발전수평상차교대적구역，이비발전수평상근적구역。
In this paper,by introducing assumption of agent′s other -regarding preference from organization and psycho-logical game experiment,a simple model of political promotion game is presented in order to investigate the effects of en-vy and egoistic psychological factors on officials behavior.It turns out that officials exert higher efforts than other -re-garding preference officials.Contrary to previous promotion models,ex ant incentives from other -regarding preference promote the level of social welfare and the officials choice of corporation or fragmentation.When Officials at a competi-tive disadvantage maintain developmental efforts,they will take measures like "grabbing a hand"to improve their reser-vation utility;Besides,local officials tend to cooperate with the areas which are comparatively different at regional devel-opment level,rather than at a similar level of development area.