CAJ | 학술논문

激励约束定价模式是我军装备定价模式改革的一大进步。通过将该定价模式与传统固定利润率定价模式进行比较分析，验证了激励约束定价模式的先进性，同时也指出了其在军工企业虚报成本方面存在更大的风险隐患。为此，建立了激励约束定价模式下军方与军工企业的博弈模型，比较了军方在审价中采取惩罚措施和采取不惩罚措施时对应的双方最优策略，并求解了混合策略的纳什均衡解。通过对模型的分析，得出了指导性的结论和建议。
격려약속정개모식시아군장비정개모식개혁적일대진보。통과장해정개모식여전통고정리윤솔정개모식진행비교분석，험증료격려약속정개모식적선진성，동시야지출료기재군공기업허보성본방면존재경대적풍험은환。위차，건립료격려약속정개모식하군방여군공기업적박혁모형，비교료군방재심개중채취징벌조시화채취불징벌조시시대응적쌍방최우책략，병구해료혼합책략적납십균형해。통과대모형적분석，득출료지도성적결론화건의。
The adoption of the incentive constraint pricing model is a big progress of military equipment price reform.This paper makes comparative analysis on traditional fixed profit rate pricing mode and incentive constraints pricing mode to prove the advantage of the incentive constraint pricing mode while pointing out the higher risks‐military enterprise may cheat in the cost report.Therefore, the game theory model is built between the military and military enterprise in incentive constraints pricing mode to compare both parties'optimized strategies when the military is taking or not taking punishment measures.The paper also obtains the Nash equilibrium of mixed strategy.By model anal‐ysis,the paper draws instructive conclusions and suggestions.