CAJ | 학술논문

通过研究风险投资减持过程中的盈余管理，本文发现，在减持过程中，风险投资试图影响管理层，以提高减持前的会计收益，从而获得更高的减持收益，但这种模式只存在利用后半年定期报告进行减持时机选择的情况下，这意味着风险投资的盈余管理减持时机选择有赖于上市公司本身的盈余管理动机。且随着风险投资在减持前持股比例的增加，风险投资减持对后半年季度盈余管理的影响能力进一步增加。进一步研究发现，由于国有风险投资对被投资企业的谈判能力更强，参与程度更高，其表现出比非国有风险投资更显著的减持机会主义。在控制内生性问题后，上述结论依然没有发生重大变化。
통과연구풍험투자감지과정중적영여관리，본문발현，재감지과정중，풍험투자시도영향관리층，이제고감지전적회계수익，종이획득경고적감지수익，단저충모식지존재이용후반년정기보고진행감지시궤선택적정황하，저의미착풍험투자적영여관리감지시궤선택유뢰우상시공사본신적영여관리동궤。차수착풍험투자재감지전지고비례적증가，풍험투자감지대후반년계도영여관리적영향능력진일보증가。진일보연구발현，유우국유풍험투자대피투자기업적담판능력경강，삼여정도경고，기표현출비비국유풍험투자경현저적감지궤회주의。재공제내생성문제후，상술결론의연몰유발생중대변화。
As sponsors of IPO firms,Venture Capitalists(VCs)play very important role in capital market.According to the investigation of Zero2Ipo research institute,about 50%IPO firms in Small Board and GEM witness the participation of VC.In order to improve in-vestor protection,the government in China mandatorily stipulated equity lockup period of VC after IPO.The equity selling after lockup period will not only bring great pressure to the market,but also have a negative impact on IPO firms,for monitor and value-adding service will disappear as VC exit.So VCs’behavior after the expiration of lock-up period has a sig-nificant influence on the healthy development of capital market. VCs are different from other large shareholders of IPO firms in several aspects.For ex-ample,the limited lifetime and special organizational structure of VCs mean that VCs must pay attention to how to get back their original investment and receive high returns,so VCs are likely to participate in portfolio firms’IPO activities opportunistically and have moral haz-ard problems.However in contrast,VCs’investment is a repeated game,so the reputation of professional investors is crucial to their future investments and financing.In this case,the reputation cost and litigation cost must be considered when selling equity after lockup period. Therefore they carefully make selling decisions,and even tried to hold overvalued IPO shares in order to build a reputation. So when selling equity,VCs will behavior opportunistically or professionally,depending on their consideration of the benefit and cost.Currently,VCs’equity selling after the expira-tion of lock-up period in China is still a new phenomenon,with few studies discussing it.And China’s capital market is an emerging market without a long history.Although the regulatory systems are being improved,there are still some problems with the market mechanism and support systems,which result in low investor protection and further exacerbate the moral hazard problem of VCs.Therefore,this paper studies VCs’equity selling from earnings management perspectives under Chian’s current institutional background. We find that VCs try to put pressure on the management to increase accounting income before selling,and finally receive higher selling returns.However,this phenomenon only ex-ists in the equity selling right after the third-quarter and annual financial report,which means that the success of VCs’equity selling timing through earnings management depends on the portfolio firms’motive to management earnings management.And also,VCs’ability to in-fluence the quarterly earnings management increases with their stockholding before selling. Further result shows that due to stronger bargaining power and more participation in the portfolio firms,government-sponsored VCs behavior significantly more opportunistically than non-government-sponsored VCs.After controlling of endogenous problem,the conclusions remain unchanged.Our paper gives evidence to the opportunistic behavior of VCs in China’s market and enlarges the institutional investors opportunism literature through the equity sell-ing after the expiration of lock-up period and earnings management.