CAJ | 학술논문

本文研究了因改制上市模式不同所导致的控股股东掏空动机差异和控股股东持股比例及其交互作用对债务结构的影响。研究结果发现，相对于非存续分立公司，存续分立公司有息债务比例较高、债务期限较短，这种关系随着控股股东持股比例的增加而减弱；非存续分立公司控股股东持股比例与有息债务占总债务的比例和债务期限负相关，存续分立公司控股股东持股比例对有息债务占总债务的比例和债务期限没有显著影响。研究结果表明，公司债务结构决策未必是为了解决公司代理问题，也可能是公司代理问题的体现。
본문연구료인개제상시모식불동소도치적공고고동도공동궤차이화공고고동지고비례급기교호작용대채무결구적영향。연구결과발현，상대우비존속분립공사，존속분립공사유식채무비례교고、채무기한교단，저충관계수착공고고동지고비례적증가이감약；비존속분립공사공고고동지고비례여유식채무점총채무적비례화채무기한부상관，존속분립공사공고고동지고비례대유식채무점총채무적비례화채무기한몰유현저영향。연구결과표명，공사채무결구결책미필시위료해결공사대리문제，야가능시공사대리문제적체현。
This paper investigates the effects of state-owned enterprise restructuring type,shareholding structure,and their interactions on the debt structure.We find that,in-completely restructured companies have more interest-bearing debt and more (less)short-term debt than completely restructured companies,which is more obvious as controlling shareholder’s ownership percentage is smaller;controlling shareholder’s ownership percent-age of completely restructured companies is negatively related with interest-bearing debt ratio and debt maturity;controlling shareholder’s ownership percentage of completely restructured companies has no significant effects on interest-bearing debt ratio and debt maturity.Our evi-dence shows that companies’debt structure behaviors may not be in order to resolve agency problems of the companies,but in order to meet the private interests of controlling sharehold-ers.