中国会计评论
中國會計評論
중국회계평론
2013年
4期
369-390
,共22页
反收购条款%投资者利益保护%公司治理
反收購條款%投資者利益保護%公司治理
반수구조관%투자자이익보호%공사치리
Anti-takeover Provisions%Legal Protection to Investors%Corporate Governance
本文通过手工收集的数据,实证检验了我国上市公司章程中反收购条款的设置与公司代理成本之间的关系。研究结果表明,从整体来讲,金色降落伞条款的设立是对公司管理层的一种保护,不利于投资者利益的保护。公司治理对金色降落伞条款的效应有影响:民营企业设立金色降落伞条款,不利于降低代理成本。但前十大股东持股比例越高,设定金色降落伞条款越不利于降低代理成本。限制提名董事人选的股东资格条款、交错董事会条款、绝对多数条款对于降低上市公司代理成本没有显著的影响。本文的研究结论为法与金融文献提供了公司层面的法律规章同样对投资者利益保护有影响的我国上市公司的经验证据,也将促使我国理论界、立法机构和监管部门重新思考公司层面的法律规章的合理性和可能存在的问题。
本文通過手工收集的數據,實證檢驗瞭我國上市公司章程中反收購條款的設置與公司代理成本之間的關繫。研究結果錶明,從整體來講,金色降落傘條款的設立是對公司管理層的一種保護,不利于投資者利益的保護。公司治理對金色降落傘條款的效應有影響:民營企業設立金色降落傘條款,不利于降低代理成本。但前十大股東持股比例越高,設定金色降落傘條款越不利于降低代理成本。限製提名董事人選的股東資格條款、交錯董事會條款、絕對多數條款對于降低上市公司代理成本沒有顯著的影響。本文的研究結論為法與金融文獻提供瞭公司層麵的法律規章同樣對投資者利益保護有影響的我國上市公司的經驗證據,也將促使我國理論界、立法機構和鑑管部門重新思攷公司層麵的法律規章的閤理性和可能存在的問題。
본문통과수공수집적수거,실증검험료아국상시공사장정중반수구조관적설치여공사대리성본지간적관계。연구결과표명,종정체래강,금색강락산조관적설립시대공사관리층적일충보호,불리우투자자이익적보호。공사치리대금색강락산조관적효응유영향:민영기업설립금색강락산조관,불리우강저대리성본。단전십대고동지고비례월고,설정금색강락산조관월불리우강저대리성본。한제제명동사인선적고동자격조관、교착동사회조관、절대다수조관대우강저상시공사대리성본몰유현저적영향。본문적연구결론위법여금융문헌제공료공사층면적법률규장동양대투자자이익보호유영향적아국상시공사적경험증거,야장촉사아국이론계、입법궤구화감관부문중신사고공사층면적법률규장적합이성화가능존재적문제。
With the completion of the reform of non-tradable shares,the biggest obstacle to hostile takeover has disappeared in China,listed companies faces the threat of takeover will be bigger and bigger,takeover and anti-takeover has become the theme of Chinese capital market.In international comparison research under the framework of law and finance,there is a information distortion problem in corporate level of legal protection for investors.The company’s charter is the “constitution”of a company,is the effective contract balancing the relationship between investors and management.Therefore,by increasing or decreasing some provisions of the company’s charter,to prevent some behavior of the management or the con-trolling shareholder,to improve the investor protection degree of the national level.Whether or not listed companies use anti-takeover correctly,not only relates to the future development of listed companies,more will affect Chinese capital market order.However,research related to the impact of the company’s charter on the right of the investors protection is less in Chi-na. The paper examines the relationship between the set of anti-takeover provisions in the charter of listed companies with the agency costs by using the manually collecting data.The results show that the the golden parachutes terms will protect the company’s management not the investors.However,the terms of the set of golden parachutes will strengthen the nature of the largest shareholder and equity checks and balances on the role of corporate governance, help to reduce agency costs.The establishment of the anti-takeover provisions,such as re-strict the shareholder eligibility provisions of nominating candidates for directorship,stag-gered terms and conditions of the board,and the vast majority of the terms did not signifi-cantly reduce the agency costs of listed companies,and did not play its due role.The conclu-sions of this study provides Chinese listed companies empirical evidences that a corporate level laws and regulations can protect investors for law and finance literature.It also enable the theorists,legislative bodies and regulatory authorities to rethink the rationality and possible problems of company level laws and regulations.