CAJ | 학술논문

本文利用2008—2012年国有上市公司相关数据，将高管腐败根据监管部分发现的可能性分为显性腐败和隐性腐败，本文的实证研究发现：(1)对于显性腐败，在中央国有企业中高薪可以抑制显性腐败，在地方国有企业中高薪不可以抑制显性腐败；进一步研究发现，市场化进程的提高，弱化了高薪对显性腐败的抑制作用在中央国有企业与地方国有企业之间的差异，并且处在高市场化地区的地方国有企业，高薪表现出抑制显性腐败的功效。(2)对于隐性腐败，高薪不能够抑制隐性腐败，并且高管薪酬与隐性腐败具有正相关关系，支持了管理层控制论；进一步研究发现随着市场化进程的提高和管理层权力的降低，高薪表现出了抑制隐性腐败的功效。实证研究结果表明，中国政府解决腐败问题不能盲目照搬新加坡的“高薪养廉”制度，应注重加强建设激励和监督并重的治腐机制。
본문이용2008—2012년국유상시공사상관수거，장고관부패근거감관부분발현적가능성분위현성부패화은성부패，본문적실증연구발현：(1)대우현성부패，재중앙국유기업중고신가이억제현성부패，재지방국유기업중고신불가이억제현성부패；진일보연구발현，시장화진정적제고，약화료고신대현성부패적억제작용재중앙국유기업여지방국유기업지간적차이，병차처재고시장화지구적지방국유기업，고신표현출억제현성부패적공효。(2)대우은성부패，고신불능구억제은성부패，병차고관신수여은성부패구유정상관관계，지지료관리층공제론；진일보연구발현수착시장화진정적제고화관리층권력적강저，고신표현출료억제은성부패적공효。실증연구결과표명，중국정부해결부패문제불능맹목조반신가파적“고신양렴”제도，응주중가강건설격려화감독병중적치부궤제。
Based on the background of corruption in China,the paper uses a sample of state-owned listed firms from 2008 to 2012 and divided the executive corruption into explicit corruption and implicit corruption according to the possibility of discovery.The paper finds that:(1)For the explicit corruption,high salary suppresses corruption in central state-owned enterprises.Because there is interdependence between the local state-owned enterprises and local governments,the power of supervision of local government is weaker.Therefore it is in-crease the opportunistic behavior of local state-owned enterprises.High salary is unable to suppress explicit corruption in local state-owned enterprises and the negative correlation be-tween them is weaker in local government enterprises than in central state-owned enterprises. Further study finds that with the increase of the market process,the difference between them is weaker and and in areas of high market,high salary suppresses corruption in local state-owned enterprises.(2)For the implicit corruption,high salary is unable to suppress corrup-tion,and a positive relationship exists between them,which supports the management power theory.There are problems of “internal control”in state-owned companies,therefore the manger has the opportunity to use their control power to obtain monetary gains and non-mo-netary benefits.And also,with the increase of the market process and the reduce of manage-ment power,high salary is able to suppresses implicit corruption. The empirical results show that we can not blindly copy Singapore’s “high salary for clean government”system to solve the problem of corruption,we must strengthen supervision mechanism and incentive mechanism to solve the managerial corruption.