CAJ | 학술논문

基于博弈分析视角对制造业与物流业动态联动中双方的信任合作进行研究。首先从一次性博弈进行分析，发现制造业与物流业的选择结果是“不信任”的帕累托低效均衡解；其次从无限次重复博弈进行分析，结果显示制造业与物流业双方都摆脱了一次性博弈困境，选择结果是“信任”的帕累托最优均衡解；最后引入政府的介入，发现会显著影响制造业与物流业联动信任的策略选择结果。研究认为应该从制造业与物流业加大行业自律、政府加大介入程度等方面完善两业动态联动信任机制。
기우박혁분석시각대제조업여물류업동태련동중쌍방적신임합작진행연구。수선종일차성박혁진행분석，발현제조업여물류업적선택결과시“불신임”적파루탁저효균형해；기차종무한차중복박혁진행분석，결과현시제조업여물류업쌍방도파탈료일차성박혁곤경，선택결과시“신임”적파루탁최우균형해；최후인입정부적개입，발현회현저영향제조업여물류업련동신임적책략선택결과。연구인위응해종제조업여물류업가대행업자률、정부가대개입정도등방면완선량업동태련동신임궤제。
Based on the game,the paper studies the trust and dynamic cooperation of both sides of manufacturing industry and logistics industry.By using the one -off game model,we find both the manufacturing industry and logistics industry will choose the Pareto inefficient equilibrium solution,which means “to distrust”each other.By using the infinitely repeated game model,they will get out of the dilemma posed by one -off game,and choose the Pareto optimal equilibrium solution,which means“to trust”each other,with the government's involvement,the alliance members will be greatly influenced on their strategies in the game.The research thinks that should from the manufacturing and logistics industry increase the perfect dynamic trust mechanism of self -discipline,increased government intervention degree etc.