CAJ | 학술논문

通过建立完全信息静态博弈下机场与航空公司基于供应链的上下游垄断的模型，分析模型并且和机场与航空公司组建的纵向一体化的战略联盟 M的结果进行对比，发现组建战略联盟可以获得更多的利润和社会福利。与此同时，根据鲁宾斯坦的讨价还价模型，对战略联盟 M的剩余利润 R 在机场与航空公司的如何分配进行分析，最终找出长期情况下，只要二者拥有足够的耐心来维持战略联盟的稳定性，机场与航空公司会达到平分剩余利润 R 的稳态。
통과건립완전신식정태박혁하궤장여항공공사기우공응련적상하유롱단적모형，분석모형병차화궤장여항공공사조건적종향일체화적전략련맹 M적결과진행대비，발현조건전략련맹가이획득경다적리윤화사회복리。여차동시，근거로빈사탄적토개환개모형，대전략련맹 M적잉여리윤 R 재궤장여항공공사적여하분배진행분석，최종조출장기정황하，지요이자옹유족구적내심래유지전략련맹적은정성，궤장여항공공사회체도평분잉여리윤 R 적은태。
A upstream-downstream monopoly model by static game analysis with perfect information that based on a supply chain between airports and airlines was built.We analyzed this model and used the result for comparing the outcome of the vertical integration of strategic alliance Mbetween airports and airlines.We find that setting up the strategic alliance can earn more profits and social welfare via comparison.At the same time,we used the Rubinstein bargaining model to seek how to allocate the surplus profits R of the strategic alliance M.Ultimately,we find that in the long run,only the two have enough patient to maintain the stability of the alliance,can they reach the steady state of dividing the surplus profits R.