武汉科技大学学报(自然科学版)
武漢科技大學學報(自然科學版)
무한과기대학학보(자연과학판)
JOURNAL OF WUHAN UNIVERSITY OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY(NATURAL SCIENCE EDITION)
2015年
2期
152-156
,共5页
排污权交易%双边拍卖%拍卖机制%激励相容性%污染治理
排汙權交易%雙邊拍賣%拍賣機製%激勵相容性%汙染治理
배오권교역%쌍변박매%박매궤제%격려상용성%오염치리
emission trading%double auction%auction mechanism%incentive compatibility%pollution treatment
在多个排污权交易者随时到达拍卖平台投标并随时离开拍卖平台的前提下,采用网上双边拍卖模式对排污权交易进行建模,并设计了一种公平、有效的拍卖机制。该机制不仅能在完全未知将来投标序列的情况下立即对当前投标做出分配和支付的决策,而且满足激励相容性、个体理性、实时出清和弱预算平衡的要求,使得排污权从治理成本低的污染者流向治理成本高的污染者,从而降低了全社会的污染治理成本。最后通过一个排污权交易的算例描述了如何实现本文提出的网上双边拍卖机制。
在多箇排汙權交易者隨時到達拍賣平檯投標併隨時離開拍賣平檯的前提下,採用網上雙邊拍賣模式對排汙權交易進行建模,併設計瞭一種公平、有效的拍賣機製。該機製不僅能在完全未知將來投標序列的情況下立即對噹前投標做齣分配和支付的決策,而且滿足激勵相容性、箇體理性、實時齣清和弱預算平衡的要求,使得排汙權從治理成本低的汙染者流嚮治理成本高的汙染者,從而降低瞭全社會的汙染治理成本。最後通過一箇排汙權交易的算例描述瞭如何實現本文提齣的網上雙邊拍賣機製。
재다개배오권교역자수시도체박매평태투표병수시리개박매평태적전제하,채용망상쌍변박매모식대배오권교역진행건모,병설계료일충공평、유효적박매궤제。해궤제불부능재완전미지장래투표서렬적정황하립즉대당전투표주출분배화지부적결책,이차만족격려상용성、개체이성、실시출청화약예산평형적요구,사득배오권종치리성본저적오염자류향치리성본고적오염자,종이강저료전사회적오염치리성본。최후통과일개배오권교역적산례묘술료여하실현본문제출적망상쌍변박매궤제。
T his paper models the emission trading as an online double auction under the condition that emission traders arrive at and depart from the auction platform dynamically ,and proposes a fair and efficient auction mechanism .This mechanism can not only make allocation and payment decisions a‐bout current biddings immediately without the knowledge of future bidding sequences but also satisfy the requirement of incentive compatibility ,individual rationality ,real‐time clearing and weak budget balance .So it drives emission permits from polluters of low treatment cost to those of high treatment cost ,thus reduces the pollution treatment cost of the w hole society .Finally ,an example of emission trading show s how to realize the proposed online double auction mechanism .