CAJ | 학술논문

如何提高中国专利的转化率已成为专利工作的重点内容。运用以有限理性为基础的演化博弈论，从专利许可的二次研发角度构建一个演化博弈模型，分析不对称环境条件下有限理性的专利权人与被许可者的专利许可行为决策，并探讨决定系统收敛方向的影响参数，研究得出二次研发的激励动机受到二次研发的成本、二次研发的额外收益、专利转化的成功率和收益分配比例的影响。最后结合我国实际提出相应的道德风险规避建议，以及激励机制的政策建议。
여하제고중국전리적전화솔이성위전리공작적중점내용。운용이유한이성위기출적연화박혁론，종전리허가적이차연발각도구건일개연화박혁모형，분석불대칭배경조건하유한이성적전리권인여피허가자적전리허가행위결책，병탐토결정계통수렴방향적영향삼수，연구득출이차연발적격려동궤수도이차연발적성본、이차연발적액외수익、전리전화적성공솔화수익분배비례적영향。최후결합아국실제제출상응적도덕풍험규피건의，이급격려궤제적정책건의。
To increase the patent conversion rate is a crucial problem for China nowadays.This paper applies for the evolu-tionary game theory on the point of secondary development after patent licensing.Through analyzing the behavior decisions of the patentee and the licensee under the environment of asymmetric information with bound rationality,this paper reveals four key factors which influence the system evolution and the stability of equilibrium.It also makes corresponding sugges-tions on the avoidance of moral hazard and the encouragement of secondary development combining the actual condition of China.