CAJ | 학술논문

煤矿安全监察是保障煤炭行业安全生产的重要手段和途径，既有文献关于煤矿安全国家监察传统博弈研究的假设大都与实际情况不符，对于在有限理性下的长期动态博弈过程缺乏相关研究。根据煤矿安全国家监察中各参与方的行为策略以及不同策略条件下的各方收益，运用演化博弈理论和系统动力学对其在有限理性下的长期动态博弈过程进行建模与动态性分析。研究结果表明：基于煤矿安全国家监察机构本位职能和煤矿企业本位利益界定的假设，国家监察机构与煤矿企业存在6种不同情形下的演化博弈行为和3个稳定均衡点，稳定均衡点与煤矿企业安全投资的费用、不安全投资被监察机构罚款以及期望事故损失和监察机构的监察成本、不认真执行监察职责而受到的罚款有密切关系。
매광안전감찰시보장매탄행업안전생산적중요수단화도경，기유문헌관우매광안전국가감찰전통박혁연구적가설대도여실제정황불부，대우재유한이성하적장기동태박혁과정결핍상관연구。근거매광안전국가감찰중각삼여방적행위책략이급불동책략조건하적각방수익，운용연화박혁이론화계통동역학대기재유한이성하적장기동태박혁과정진행건모여동태성분석。연구결과표명：기우매광안전국가감찰궤구본위직능화매광기업본위이익계정적가설，국가감찰궤구여매광기업존재6충불동정형하적연화박혁행위화3개은정균형점，은정균형점여매광기업안전투자적비용、불안전투자피감찰궤구벌관이급기망사고손실화감찰궤구적감찰성본、불인진집행감찰직책이수도적벌관유밀절관계。
Coal mine safety supervision is an important approach to secure the safety production of the coal industry.Most research to date has focused on studying the coal mine safety supervision from the perspective of traditional game which is not consistent with the actual situation with the assumption of totally rational participants and mutual knowledge,and the relevant research lacks long-term dynamic game process under bounded rationality.According to analyzing the behavioral strategy of game players and their income under the different strategies,the model of long-term dynamic game process un-der bounded rationality was constructed and analyzed for studying the evolutionary stable state under the different circum-stances by using the evolutionary game theory and system dynamics.The results show that there are six kinds of evolutionary game behaviors under different conditions and three stable equilibrium points between the state supervisory administration and coal mines based on the assumption of standard functions and interests,and the stable equilibrium points are not only related to the coal enterprise’s security input costs,fines for illegal production and expected casualty and property loss,but also related to the state administration’s supervision costs and fines for dereliction of duty.